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INTRODUCTION
Environmentalism is increasingly popular. Surveys show
widespread public support for preservation policies, open spaces,
and natural parks, while reflecting disdain for new development
of wild lands.' Federal and state governments have reacted to
public sentiment by adding acreage to national preserves,
increasing the budget for agencies tasked with preservation, and
enacting pollution laws and regulations.
I For example, the Nature Conservancy found in 2009 that 65% of Americans
support increased investment in federal and state land conservation. See Public
Summary of Key Findings from National Voter Survey on Conservation, LAND TRUST
ALLIANCE, available at http://www.1andtrustalliance.org/policy/TNCpoll (last visited
Dec. 26, 2011). Additionally, a recent survey shows that 57% of Americans are at
least somewhat concerned about a decline in open spaces. See Lydia Saad, Water
Issues Worry Americans Most, Global Warming Least, GALLUP (Mar. 28, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/146810/water-issues-worry-americans-global-warming-
least.aspx. According to a recent poll commissioned by the National Parks
Conservation Association, 80% of Americans believe that national parks should be a
centerpiece or an important focus of America's Great Outdoors Initiative, and 75% of
Americans believe that state parks should be a centerpiece or an important focus of
America's Great Outdoors Initiative. See Press Release, National Parks
Conservation Association, New Poll Finds Overwhelming Support for America's
Great Outdoors Initiative and National Parks (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.npca.org/media-center/press-releases/2010/new-poll-finds-
overwhelming.html. A Zogby International poll shows that 87% of Americans
support protecting public land currently designated as wilderness. See Press
Release, The Pew Center on the States, Vast Majority of Americans Believe
Protecting Wilderness Is Important (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.
pewcenteronthestates.org/news-roomdetail.aspx?id=41614.
2 See, e.g., 80-Acre Added to the Lassen Volcanic National Park and Lassen
Volcanic Wilderness, THE WILDERNESS LAND TRUST (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://www.wildernesslandtrust.org/news/eighty-acre-added-to-the-lassen-volcanic-
EASEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Despite popular support and government-initiated efforts,
forty million acres of land-larger than the state of Florida-
were newly developed between 1982 and 2007.3 No doubt,
complex and nuanced factors contribute to this rampant
development. This Article addresses one such factor: the historic
and deeply rooted pro-development policy informing American
property law.
Many policies motivate American property law but
prominent among them is the historical push to use and develop
land. The creation and enforcement of easements, for example,
favor the development of land while disfavoring parties that
allow land to remain "idle." Modern courts grant easements
bisecting a variety of terrains, including national parks,4 national
forests, undeveloped lands owned by "absentee landowners,"'
and wildlife preserves.' Courts honor or dishonor such
wilderness/ ("The Wilderness Land Trust in partnership with The Nature
Conservancy recently transferred the 80-acre private inholding to the National Park
Service-Lassen Volcanic National Park for permanent protection as a part of the
Lassen Volcanic Wilderness area."); Dave Flessner, Tennessee Valley Authority
Boosts Conservation Budget Fourfold as Public Reels Before Rate Hike, TIMES
FREE PRESS (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2008/aug/22/
chattanooga-tva-boosts-conservation-budget-fourfol/?print ("TVA Vice President Joe
Hoagland said the agency will boost its budget for energy conservation and efficiency
from $22 million this year to $99 million in fiscal 2009."); Felicity Barringer,
California Approves Stringent Pollution Curbs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/17/science/earth/17cap.html?scp= 1&sq=California
%20Approves%20Stringent%20Pollution%20Curbs&st=cse ("California regulators
on Thursday adopted the nation's most comprehensive rules to curb emissions of
carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases, a move that will put the state far
ahead of the rest of the country in energy reform... . Ten states including New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland and the New England states are participating in a
less extensive system known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which
covers only electric utilities.").
' See Press Release, United States Department of Agriculture, Latest National
Resource Inventory for Non-Federal Lands Shows Significant Reduction in Soil
Erosion on Cropland and Dramatic Increase in Developed Acreage (Apr. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSS
zPy8xBz9CPOos._gAC9-wMJ8QYOMDpxBDAO9nXw9DFxcXw2ALU_2CbEdFAF-
soRU!/?printable=true&contentidonly=true&contentid=2010%2FO4%2FO211.xml
("About 40 million acres of land were newly developed between 1982 and 2007").
' See United States v. Srnsky, 271 F.3d 595, 605 (4th Cir. 2001).
6 See Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005); Mont.
Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 884-86 (D. Mont. 1980),
affd, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981).
6 See Johnson v. Suttles, 227 P.3d 664, 666, 670 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).
See Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 189 (Vt. 2006).
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easements to enable a variety of developments, including opera
houses,8 subdivisions in the middle of wildlife preserves,9 storage
facilities,"o and fox hunting clubs.'"
While critical in the country's infancy, encouraging land use
and development through legal constructs is less important and
arguably detrimental now. Our need to develop wide swaths of
wild land has changed; our common law has not. Part I explores
the vast wilderness and open spaces of America's infancy and
how state and federal government articulated a clear objective to
settle and develop "wild lands." Part II tracks the continuing
influence of this objective in implied easements, prescriptive
easements, and express easements. Part III recognizes the lack
of a conservation counterbalance and details several approaches
that might curb pro-development bias in easement law.
I. HISTORY OF A PRO-DEVELOPMENT POLICY
The country was a wilderness, and the universal policy was to
procure its cultivation and improvement.12
-Justice Joseph Story 3
From 1803 (Louisiana Purchase) to 1853 (Gadsden
Purchase), America acquired what many map-makers referred to
as the "Great American Desert," and what colloquially became
termed the American West.14 Massive tracts of unimproved land
represented largely untapped resources, resources the federal
government hoped to exploit. 5
See Howley v. Chaffee, 93 A. 120 (Vt. 1915).
* See Berge, 915 A.2d at 189.
10 See Vandeleigh Indus., v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, L.L.C, 901 A.2d 91,
93 (Del. 2006).
n See Hunker v. Whitacre-Greer Fireproofing Co., 801 N.E.2d 469, 469 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003); Millbrook Hunt, Inc. v. Smith, 249 A.D.2d 281, 281-83, 670 N.Y.S.2d
907, 908-09 (2d Dep't 1998).
12 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137, 145 (1829).
13 Joseph Story (Sept. 18, 1779-Sept. 10, 1845) was an American lawyer and
jurist who served on the Supreme Court of the United States from 1811 to 1845. The
quote comes from a decision he authored, Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137,
145 (1829).
'4 See Michael Lewis, American Wilderness: An Introduction, in AMERICAN
WILDERNESS: A NEW HISTORY 3, 6-7 (Michael Lewis ed., 2007); see also Leo Sheep
Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 670 (1979).
"6 See Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 670-71. In deciding whether the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company's remote grantee owned an easement across federal land,
the court recalled nineteenth-century statutes and the "tremendous desire on behalf
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A. Pro-Development Policy: Colonial Era
The push to settle and cultivate wild lands began much
earlier than 1803; France, Spain, Portugal, England, and the
Netherlands all clamored to establish national claims to the
"new" lands. Building settlements strengthened such claims."
In 1854 the Supreme Court described the typical European land
grant process: "The party who desired to form a settlement upon
any unoccupied land presented his petition to the officer who had
authority to grant, stating the quantity of land he desired, the
place where it was situated, and the purposes to which it was to
be applied."" If a survey showed the land vacant, the "party
thereupon received a grant in absolute ownership."'8
Land was virtually free-save one critical condition. "These
grants were almost uniformly made upon condition of settlement,
or some other improvement."" The law did not recognize a
grantee's ownership until the grantee built something on it.2 0
Why? Competing claims among European nations depended in
part on colonization and settlement of wild lands.2 1 Even when
"hostile Indians" prevented the grantee from making
"improvements" on the land, the law held the condition unmet
and no title vested in the grantee.22 To hold otherwise would be
to "reserv[e] indefinitely. . . large bodies of uncultivated and
unoccupied lands," a result repugnant to national claims buoyed
of the federal government that the West be settled." Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 882 (D. Mont. 1980), affd, 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.
1981).
16 Cf David Morris Phillips, The Unexplored Option: Jewish Settlements in a
Palestinian State, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 75, 78-80 (2006) (Israeli settlements
are often viewed as critical in land disputes with the Palestinians). See generally
HERBERT EUGENE BOLTON & THOMAS MAITLAND MARSHALL, THE COLONIZATION OF
NORTH AMERICA, 1492-1783 (1920);
17 Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 554 (1854).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Glenn v. United States, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 250, 259 (1851); United States
v. Boisdord, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 63, 96 (1850) ("[T]he grantee might have his land
surveyed, or he might decline; he might establish himself on the land, or decline:
these acts rested wholly in his discretion. But if he failed to take possession and
establish himself, he had no claim to a title. .. ."); Buyck v. United States, 40 U.S.
(15 Pet.) 215, 222-23 (1841); United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 334, 349-52
(1840).
21 See Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 560-61.
22 See Heirs of de Vilemont v. United States, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 261, 263-67
(1851); United States v. Kingsley, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 476, 480, 483-85 (1838).
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by colonization." Like the international scramble to colonize
wild lands, subsequent American sovereignty embraced colonial
land development efforts.
B. Pro-Development Policy: American Sovereignty
Following the Homestead Act of 1862,24 the Land Ordinance
of 1785,25 the Union Pacific Act,26 and the 1864 legislation
creating the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,2 7 among others,
the nascent American government sold or pledged enormous
tracts of land both to raise money and to encourage western
settlement.28  The government doled out nearly three million
acres alongside a proposed railroad right-of-way, for example, to
subsidize the construction of the Illinois Central Railroad.2 9
Without such government inducement, no private enterprise
would confront the huge risk of constructing rail lines over vast
open spaces.3 0 As Horace Greeley depicted it: "The amount is too
vast; the enterprise too formidable; the returns too remote and
uncertain."31
Checkerboard land grants came to characterize the
government's effort to induce private railroad development. The
Union Pacific Act of 1862 granted public land to the railroad for
2 See Fremont, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 569-70 (Catron, J., dissenting).
2 43 U.S.C. § 161 (repealed 1976).
25 CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, AN ORDINANCE FOR ASCERTAINING THE MODE OF
DISPOSING OF LANDS IN THE WESTERN TERRITORY (1785), reprinted in 28 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 375-76 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,
Gov't Printing Office 1933).
26 See Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492, (1862), amended by Act
of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, § 4, 13 Stat. 356, 358 (1864).
27 The Northern Pacific Railroad Company was created by an act of Congress.
See Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365, 365-72 (1864) ("An Act granting Lands
to aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from Lake Superior to
Puget's Sound, on the Pacific Coast, by the Northern Rout6").
28 See DAVID HAWARD BAIN, EMPIRE EXPRESS: BUILDING THE FIRST
TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 115, 180 (1999); cf Lewis, supra note 14 ("Some
historians have viewed the interaction between settlers and raw wilderness as the
central reality of early American history.").
2 See Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466 (1850); Leo Sheep Co. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 668, 673 (1979).
3o HORACE GREELEY, A Railroad to the Pacific, in AN OVERLAND JOURNEY, FROM
NEW YORK TO SAN FRANCISCO, IN THE SUMMER OF 1859, at 383-86 (C. M. Saxton,
Barker & Co. 1860).
at Id. at 383-84.
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each mile of track that it laid. Odd numbered plots were
granted to the railroad while the government retained even
numbered plots. Similar schemes induced construction of the
Northern Pacific Railroad,3 3 the Illinois Central Railroad,3 4 and
others. This pervasive3 5 nineteenth-century "checkerboardling]"
continues to spur modern easement disputes today.36
But "animating it all was the desire of the Federal
Government that the West be settled."3 Such was the frenzy to
conquer and settle wild lands that scandal erupted when at least
one member of Congress heavily invested in Union Pacific and
was accused of bribery and misappropriating funds.38 "Railroad
men traveled to Washington and to state capitals armed with
money, shares of stock, free railroad passes. Between 1850 and
1857 they got [twenty-five] million acres of public land, free of
charge, and millions of dollars in bonds-loans-from the state
legislatures."39  The steady growth of established agrarian
communities coupled with "the feverish accumulation of
capitalism" left little room for land conservation. A
Congressional report on United States public land policy states
that "[d]uring most of the [nineteenth] century, our public land
32 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 20 § 3, 12 Stat. 489, 492 (1862), amended by Act of
July 2, 1864, ch. 216, § 4, 13 Stat. 356, 358 (1864).
3 Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 216, § 3, 13 Stat. 365, 367-68. For a good summary of
the Act's provisions, see United States v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 311 U.S. 317, 324-27
(1940).
* Act of Sept. 20, 1850, ch. 61, 9 Stat. 466 (1850); Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at
673-74.
3 See PAUL W. GATES WITH A CHAPTER BY ROBERT W. SWENSON, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 341-56 (1968).
36 See Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 671-72; Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880, 886-88 (D. Mont. 1980); Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 247
P.3d 357, 363-64 (Utah 2010); Granite Beach Holdings, L.L.C. v. State ex rel. Dep't.
of Natural Res., 11 P.3d 847, 851 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
1 Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 671.
38 Oakes Ames, a Massachusetts Congressman, invested heavily in Union
Pacific and a company it created, Credit Mobilier. An investigation recommended
Ames's expulsion from Congress following allegations of improper use of funds and
bribery. See MARGARET LEECH & HENRY J. BROWN, THE GARFIELD ORBIT 175 (1978);
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 255 (2003) ("[Union
Pacific] had been given 12 million acres of free land and $27 million in government
bonds. It created the Credit Mobilier company and gave them $94 million for
construction when the actual cost was $44 million.").
' ZINN, supra note 38, at 220.
40 Steven Stoll, Farm Against Forest, in AMERICAN WILDERNESS: A NEW
HISTORY, supra note 14, at 56-57.
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policy was basically one of disposal [of lands owned by the United
States] into non-Federal ownership to encourage settlement and
development of the country."4 '
C. Pro-Development Policy: Culture and Religion
The nineteenth-century American mentality likely paralleled
government policy. Americans valued land exploitation and
disdained uncultivated and unimproved land. One commentator
describes a "historic American view that forests, wetlands,
grasslands, deserts and other lands in natural condition
contribute nothing to the social welfare until they are converted
to economic use. "42 Forests, wetlands, deserts, hill country, and
other undeveloped land were seen as worthless until cleared,
drained, cultivated, or otherwise converted into useful product.43
Visiting from France in the early nineteenth century, Alexis
de Tocqueville observed that Americans
are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature, and they
may be said not to perceive the mighty forests which surround
them till they fall beneath the hatchet. Their eyes are fixed
upon another sight: . .. [the] march across these wilds-drying
swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and
subduing nature. 44
Preservation of wild lands and conservation of undeveloped open
spaces have no place under this articulation of America's historic
development model.45
41 U.S. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 28 (1970); see also GREGORY
YALE, LEGAL TITLES TO MINING CLAIMS AND WATER RIGHTS, IN CALIFORNIA, UNDER
THE MINING LAW OF CONGRESS OF JULY, 1866, at iv-v, 10-13 (1867).
42 John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840 (1994) (emphasis added).
4 See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND, at xiii
(4th ed. 2001) ("Nature lost its significance as something to which people belonged
and became an adversary, a target, merely an object for exploitation."); Alexandra B.
Klass, Adverse Possession and Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use
and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 292-95 (2006).
44 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 105-106 (Henry Reeve
trans., 2008).
4 See NASH, supra note 43, at xii ("The largest portion of the energy of early
[American] civilization was directed at conquering wildness in nature and
eliminating it in human nature.").
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EASEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Religious context arguably complements the development
model. According to some historians, nineteenth-century Judeo-
Christians harbored animus toward the wilderness.4 6 The book
of Genesis confers dominion to mankind over all birds and beasts;
believers are admonished to "fill the earth and subdue it."47
Early settlers took these provisions to heart, viewing
uncultivated wild land as dangerous and ungodly.48 The
controversial 1967 article by historian Lynn White decried the
Judeo-Christian worldview of dominion as incompatible to
environmentalism.4 9  It should be noted, of course, that Judeo-
Christian theology on environmental issues is hardly one-sided;
several approaches to stewardship and sustainability reflect
current conservationist sentiment.so
All these factors: (1) international seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century competition to claim land through settlement;
(2) America's early pro-development policy; (3) the nineteenth-
century American attitude disfavoring idle lands, and
(4) religious support for dominion and subjugation of wild lands
forged the common law.
It is not surprising that these factors helped stamp pro-
development bias into American property law. Our British legal
progenitors, as early as 1658, decried the very existence of un-
developed land: "[I]t is not only a private inconvenience, but it is
also to the prejudice of the public weal, that land should lie fresh
and unoccupied."'
46 See Lewis, supra note 14, at 7-8.
47 Genesis 1:26 (English Standard) ("Then God said, 'Let us make man in our
image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and
over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over
every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.' "); id. at 1:28 ("And God said to them,
'Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it and have dominion over the
fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that
moves on the earth.' ").
48 See NASH, supra note 43, at 13.
4' Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCIENCE
1203, 1205-07 (1967).
s0 See WESLEY GRANBERG-MICHAELSON, Renewing the Whole Creation:
Constructing a Theology of Relationship, SOJOURNERS MAGAZINE, Feb.-Mar. 1990,
at 1, 2-4 (describing the Christian theology of stewardship and the sacred
relationship between God, humans, and creation as an essential element of the
environmental movement).
"1 A. J. Bradbrook, Access to Landlocked Land: A Comparative Study of Legal
Solutions, 10 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 57, (1983) (quoting Packer v. Welsted, 82 Eng. Rep.
1244 (K.B. 1658) (a 1658 decision of the King's Bench)).
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D. Pro-Development Policy: Today
Americans today do not share their ancestor's drive to
develop "idle" land. 52  Surveys show that a large "majority of
Americans believe there should be stronger policies protecting
open space, that it is everyone's obligation to protect open
space,... and that more lands should be set aside for rare or
endangered species, national parks, and protection of historical
landscapes."3 There is a growing acknowledgement that supply
of wild lands is limited,5 4 and "that access to areas of natural,
undeveloped land benefits society."5 5  Eroding plant and animal
diversity through land development and destruction of natural
habitats increases popular anxiety.56
" See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV.
433, 455-56 (1984) ("Today, however, American society has generally rejected full
development in favor of conservation."). See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST
(1992).
" See Mass, supra note 43, at 284, 296 & n.69 ("citing 1996 survey mailed to
random sampling of 2,000 individuals across the U.S. with equal distribution by
gender, location, and socioeconomic profiles indicating 77.7% agreed or strongly
agreed that policies protecting open space could be stronger, 86.5% agreed or
strongly agreed that everyone should look after open space, 81.7% agreed or strongly
agreed that everyone should have access to outdoor recreational areas, 71.2% agreed
or strongly agreed that policies protecting farmland from development should be
stronger, 54.4% agreed or strongly agreed that lands providing habitat for rare or
endangered species are the most important lands to protect, 70.7% agreed or
strongly agreed that more areas should be set aside as national parks so they are
protected from development, and 57.1% agreed or strongly agreed that more
emphasis should be placed on protecting historical landscapes"); Karlyn Bowman,
Revisiting Attitudes About Global Warming as Summer Heats up, AM. ENTER. INST.
(July 1, 1999), http://www.aei.orglarticle/10525.
"' See William E. Cooper & Raymond D. Vlasen, Ecological Concepts and
Applications to Planning, in NAT'L Sol. FOUND, ENVIRONMENT: A NEW FocUS FOR
LAND-USE PLANNING, 183, 203 (Donald M. McAllister ed., 1973).
* Korngold, supra note 52, at 443.
56 See generally Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered
Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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In response, federal and state governments"7 have added
land and funding to national parks and other conservation
efforts.5 8 Park base funding increased from nine-hundred million
dollars in 2001 to over one billion dollars by 2006."9 Park acreage
in the lower forty-eight states increased incrementally from
seven million acres in 1930 to nineteen million acres in 2000.0
While most insist that government play a large role in wild land
conservation,6 ' many are dissatisfied with the results.
One commentator characterizes government efforts as
"regulatory patches" that "operate in the shadows of [] the super-
dominance of private control of land."6 2  Others distrust
government with such an important task, citing bureaucratic
delay, ineptitude, and fickleness.63 In economic downturns
legislatures target parks and conservation programs for budget
17 Congress determines who runs federal public lands under two Constitutional
provisions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress power "to exercise like
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards,
and other needful Buildings"); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States,
or of any particular State.").
" See generally California Desert Protection Act of 1994, 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa
(2006); Tongass Timber Reform Act, 16 U.S.C. § 539d (2006); National Wildlife
Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006); Wilderness Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1131 (2006); National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 (2006); Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2006); National Forest Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2006); Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act,
16 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (2006).
69 FiscAL YEAR 2006 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, NAT'L PARK
SERv. 8 (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://home.nps.gov/applications/budget2/
fy06gbk.htm.
60 William A. Wines, A Proposal to Greatly Expand National Parks in the Lower
Forty-Eight States: An Investment in Our Planet's Future, 12 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 130, 146 (2005).
61 Council of Excellence in Government, America Unplugged: Citizens and their
Government, (July 1999). Nearly two-thirds of all adults surveyed in a Council for
Excellence in Government poll stated that the government must have a part in
cleaning up the environment. Of adult age groups, the 18-34 year old group had the
highest percentage with 71%. Id.
62 Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory
System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 446-47 (2007).
See generally Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and
National Park Service: Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and
Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625 (1997) (tracing public mistrust of
governmental agencies entrusted with environmental goals).
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cuts.64 The distrust amplifies when, for example, the National
Forest Service authorizes oil and gas development, mining,
logging, and hunting in national forests.65  This oxymoronic
quest, to simultaneously conserve and exploit, is not a new one.
The 1897 "Organic Act"66 authorized management and protection
of what were to become the national forests while at the same
time requiring "a continuous supply of timber for the use and
necessities of citizens of the United States."7 None of these
government efforts, however misguided or successful, confronts
the ongoing common law policy favoring land development.6 8
Frustration with government efforts may, in part, explain
the relatively recent surge in private conservation efforts. 9
Private landowners have dedicated over five million acres of land
' See, e.g., Klass, supra note 43, at 296-97; Associated Press, Arizona: Parks
Are Casualties of Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/us/16brfs-PARKSARECASUBRF.html; Jenny
Brundin, State Parks Juggle More Visitors With Budget Cuts (National Public Radio
broadcast Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=114308714 ("Because of the down economy, state and local government have
put the squeeze on spending. Some of the first items on the chopping block were
parks and after-school recreation programs.").
65 7 C.F.R. § 2.60 (2009) (delegating authority to the Chief of the Forest
Service to manage the National Forest System); National Park Versus National
Forest?: What's in a Name?, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/grsm/
planyourvisit/np-versus-nf.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2011) (Regulation of National
Forest Service includes "not only resource preservation, but other kinds of use as
well. Under this concept of 'multiple use,' national forests are managed to provide
Americans with a wide variety of services and commodities, including lumber, cattle
grazing, mineral products and recreation with and without vehicles.").
66 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-82, 551 (2006).
67 Id. § 475.
68 Sprankling, supra note 42, at 819-20, 849 ("Despite increasing concern for
preservation, the momentum of the development model continues as the twenty-first
century approaches.").
69 See Nancy A. McLaughlin & Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public
Interest and Investment in Conservation: A Response to Professor Korngold's Critique
of Conservation Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561, 1561-65. See generally
ALLISON DUNHAM, PRESERVATION OF OPEN SPACE AREAS: A STUDY OF THE NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ROLE (1966) (addressing private land rights for use by
organizations interested preserving open space); LAND SAVING ACTION: A WRITTEN
SYMPOSIUM BY 29 EXPERTS ON PRIVATE LAND CONSERVATION IN THE 1980S (Russell
L. Brenneman & Sarah M. Bates eds., 1984) (written symposium on conservation
issues and land preservation management); MONT. LAND RELIANCE & LAND TRUST
EXCH., PRIVATE OPTIONS: TOOLS AND CONCEPTS FOR LAND CONSERVATION (Barbara
Rushmore et al. ed., 1982) (collection of articles discussing private conservation
techniques).
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to conservation through conservation easements. 0 Conservation
easements are not like traditional right-of-way easements;
instead, they confer a non-possessory interest in land to a third
party with a concomitant obligation to "use" the land by
preserving its "natural, scenic, or open space values" and
protecting it against development." Much has been said about
the benefits and detriments inherent in conservation
easements.
Regardless of both private and public efforts, wild land
continues to yield to development. According to government
statistics, about forty million acres of land-larger than the state
of Florida-were newly developed between 1982 and 2007.7' The
government's own summary says that "[tihis means that more
than one-third of all land that has ever been developed in the
lower 48 states was developed during the last quarter century."74
This development "sprawl" consumed 2.2 million acres of land in
the United States each year between 1997 and 2001, up from 1.4
million acres per year between 1982 and 1992."
How can development of wild lands exponentially increase
when public opinion favors land and resource conservation? The
answer is larger than this Article, but a substantial piece of the
answer is rooted deep in historic property law, deep in the
nineteenth-century formation of policies that viewed land as
worthless until developed. As one professor put it, "[tloday,
despite a fundamentally different national landscape, the
property-law system still actively facilitates the despoliation of
10 Klass, supra note 43, at 283-84.
71 See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (1981).
72 Compare Korngold, supra note 52, at 443, with McLaughlin & Machlis, supra
note 69, at 1572-81.
73 NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., SUMMARY
REPORT: 2007 NATIONAL RESOURCES INVENTORY 7 (2009), available at http://www.
nres.usda.gov/Internet/FSEDOCUMENTS//stelprdblO4l379.pdf; Florida Facts,
FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, http://www.flhsmv.gov/fhp/html/floridafacts.html (last
visited July 30, 2011).
74 NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., supra note 73.
75 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. 2007 FARM BILL THEME PAPERS: RURAL DEVELOPMENT
JULY 2006 7 (2007), available at http://www.usda.gov/documents/Farmbill07rural
development.pdf; see also chart at App. A.
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our scattered wilderness remnants."6 The doctrine of adverse
possession illustrates the law's preference for development over
conservation.
E. Pro-Development Policy: Adverse Possession
The doctrine of adverse possession takes title from the
original owner and awards it to an interloper based on use of the
property." The transfer occurs without the consent and over the
objection of the title owner." Use is valued over non-use, a
concept nineteenth-century jurists sharpened by measuring the
actions required for adverse possession by the character of the
land involved." If the land was already developed (with a
residence, for example), the adverse possessor must have done
more to claim title; he must have engaged in frequent and
conspicuous use.o Conversely, if the land was undeveloped,
minor and sporadic use qualified as actual possession. It became
markedly easier to adversely possess wilderness than developed
land. 1 In the name of progress courts took title from the title
owner and awarded it to the interloper on such limited grounds
as digging of sand and gravel and allowing others to do so,82
berry picking and timber storing,83 gathering firewood,8 4 hunting
and hiking,85 and culling and taking natural hay.
76 John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 557 (1996).
" Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver &
Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 557, 569 (2011).
78 See 3 AM. JUR. 2d Adverse Possession § 246 (2011).
7 See, e.g., Bell v. Denson, 56 Ala. 444, 449 (1876) (specifically accounting for
the "character of the land"); Mooney v. Cooledge, 30 Ark. 640, 655 (1875); Worthley
v. Burbanks, 45 N.E. 779, 781 (Ind. 1897) (quoting Ewing's Lessee v. Burnet, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 41, 53 (1837)) (stating that "much depends on the nature and situation of
the property, the uses to which it can be applied").
80 Cf Worthley, 45 N.E. at 781-82 (holding that, unlike cultivated land or land
containing a residence, uncultivated land could be obtained by adverse possession
through "slight acts of dominion").
81 See, e.g., id. at 783 (holding that "fruitless efforts ... year to year to make
some beneficial use of the land" were sufficient to establish adverse possession over
uncultivated, wild land).
8 See Ewing's Lessee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 49, 51-54.
83 See Marshall v. Epps, No. 38792, 1990 WL 10092038, at *8 (Mass. Land Ct.
Feb. 6, 1990), affd, 575 N.E.2d 781 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
' See Stowell v. Swift, 576 A.2d 204, 205-06 (Me. 1990); Johnson v. Town of
Dedham, 490 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Me. 1985); Gurwit v. Kannatzer, 788 S.W.2d 293, 296
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How could owners of undeveloped land protect against
adverse possession when adverse possession could be awarded on
such limited use? One solution was to develop the land. In other
words, America's adverse possession doctrine incentivized owners
to protect against adverse claims by themselves developing their
land. "The structure of adverse possession doctrine encourages
both the owner and the adverse claimant to develop wild lands,
and thus to despoil them, in the interest of either retaining or
obtaining title."7
Several states, recognizing the inequity inherent in adverse
possession, statutorily limited its reach. Few, however, looked
deeper into the genesis of the public policy motivating adverse
possession. The Florida Supreme Court, however, alluded to the
doctrine's historical roots:
The concept of adverse possession is an ancient and, perhaps,
somewhat outdated one. It stems from a time when an ever-
increasing use of land was to be, and was, encouraged. Today,
however, faced, as we are, with problems of unchecked over-
development, depletion of precious natural resources, and
pollution of our environment, the policy reasons that once
supported the idea of adverse possession may well be
succumbing to new priorities.8 9
Adverse possession is but one example of common law
property jurisprudence that integrates the nineteenth-century
premium on land development."o Significantly, courts employ the
same philosophy when deciding easement disputes.
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Sleboda v. Heirs at Law of Harris, 508 A.2d 652, 653, 659 (R.I.
1986); Derryberry v. Ledford, 506 S.W.2d 152, 155, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
8 See Kline v. Bourbon Woods, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
86 See Weiss v. Meyer, 303 NW.2d 765, 769-70 (Neb. 1981); Thompson v.
Hayslip, 600 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ohio 1991). The true owner lost property in both cases
due to an adverse claimant's harvesting of hay.
87 Sprankling, supra note 42, at 817.
8 39 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 261 § 2 (2010).
8 Meyer v. Law, 287 So. 2d 37, 41 (Fla. 1973), superseded by statute on other
grounds, FLA. STAT. § 95.16 (1974), as recognized in Seton v. Swann, 650 So. 2d 35,
37 (Fla. 1995).
o Professor John Sprankling details five more property law doctrines infused
with pro-development, anti-wilderness policy, including the doctrines of waste,
possession as notice to a bona fide purchaser, good faith improver, trespass, and
nuisance. In each instance, early American courts molded the common law to vest
title in the industrious user over the idle claimant. Sprankling, supra note 76, at
530-56.
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II. EASEMENTS AND THE DRIVE To USE AND DEVELOP LAND
"[Tihe easement is based on social considerations encouraging
land use ... .'9
Generally speaking, an easement is an interest in real estate
that gives one person the right to use another's land for a specific
purpose.92 Easements hinge on use rather than ownership,
entitling the easement holder to use the burdened property only
to the extent necessary to realize the rights conferred by the
easement. Easements are especially powerful because they
often "run with the land" and can therefore bind successive
owners generation after generation.94 Unlike a license, which
also grants the use of one person's property to another for a
specific use, easements are not revocable.98
These broad characterizations, however, quickly give rise to
what has been called "a Byzantine tangle of doctrine with sources
in the law of property and contract and in courts of equity.""
Needless rules and obsolete policy justifications create a
convoluted field of law." Hoping to clarify otherwise complex
and archaic land use law, the Restatement (Third) of Property
integrates the law of easements, profits, and covenants and
unifies the diverse legal constructs of each into a single
streamlined field labeled "servitudes."" Distinctions between
negative and restrictive easements, as well as real covenants and
" Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 192 (Vt. 2006) (quoting Traders, Inc. v.
Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 974, 979 (Vt. 1983).
92 JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES
IN LAND § 1:1 (2011) ("An easement is commonly defined as a nonpossessory interest
in land of another."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY: EASEMENT § 450 (2011);
see, e.g., Fruth Farms, Ltd. v. Vill. of Holgate, 442 F. Supp. 2d 470, 475 (N.D. Ohio
2006); Hanna v. Robinson, 167 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (citing BRUCE &
ELY, supra); Martin Drive Corp. v. Thorsen, 786 A.2d 484, 489 (Conn. App. Ct.
2001); Silacci v. Abramson, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 37, 39 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[An easement is
merely a right to use the land of another.").
93 See, e.g., Commercial Wharf E. Condo. Ass'n v. Waterfront Parking Corp., 552
N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass. 1990); Russakoffv. Scruggs, 400 S.E.2d 529, 531-32 (Va. 1991).
94 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 9:1.
6 Id. § 1:4.
Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of
Servitudes Governing Land, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2009).
" See Morning Call, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc., 761 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000) ("The classification of interests in property which confer the right to use
another's land is a complex subject framed by arcane historical rules.").
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 cmt. a (2000); see Lobato
v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 953 n.11 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
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equitable servitudes, are largely abolished.9" Antiquated
limitations like horizontal privity requirements are also
abolished.10 The Restatement is a step in the right direction.'o
It even accounts-in a few instances-for land conservation. 0 2
But it is a small step. The Restatement continues to recognize
land use and development as a motivating policy in property law
and courts continue to rely on common law precepts rooted in
nineteenth-century anti-conservation bias.
A. The Policy Promoting Use and Development
At the heart of a great deal of easement law is a policy that
promotes land use and development. In 2006, for example, the
Vermont Supreme Court in Berge v. State implied the existence
of an easement even though the original parties did not create
one.10 3  In doing so, the court relied heavily on nineteenth-
century pro-development philosophy geared to provide claimants
as much use and enjoyment of land as possible.104
In Berge, a landowner conveyed 7,001 acres to the State of
Vermont by a deed in 1959.o1 The State then designated most of
the property as a wildlife management area, which included two
celebrated wetland habitats that support a variety of species.ce
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.3 cmt. c (2000) (dropping
negative easements); id. § 1.4 (dropping the terms "Real Covenant" and "Equitable
Servitude").
100 Id. § 1.4 cmt. a.
101 But see Dnes & Lueck, supra note 96, at 91 (describing servitude doctrine as
a "quagmire of principles possessing little apparent coherence") (internal quotation
omitted).
102 Lance Liebman, Foreword to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
(2000) ("The new work is also attentive to our growing interest in conserving and
preserving our natural, historical, and cultural resources and to the increasing use
of conservation and preservation servitudes as an important means to that end.").
103 Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 190 (Vt. 2006).
10' See id. at 192.
10' See id. at 190.
106 See Bill Sladyk Wildlife Management Area, VTFISHANDWILDLIFE.COM,
http://www.vtfishandwildlife.com/library/maps/Wildlife%20Management%20Areas/S
t%20Johnsbury%2ODistrict/Bill%20Sladyk%20WMA.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2011)
("[The] Bill Sladyk Wildlife Management Area (WMA) is a 9,493-acre parcel of land
owned and managed by the Vermont Fish & Wildlife Department.... In 1970 the
Department was able to purchase the timber rights to the property from the
Fillemore Lumber Company of Stanstead, Quebec.... A diversity of excellent
wetland habitats can be found throughout the WMA. Two wetlands of ecological
significance include Cranberry Bog and Halfway Pond. Cranberry Bog is a 26-acre
peatland bog with stunted tamaracks, black spruce, and the carnivorous pitcher
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Notably, the grantor did not convey all her property by the 1959
deed."o' She reserved thirty-eight acres that bordered a pond.108
Although she did not retain an express easement for automobile
access to the thirty-eight acres, she could access the land by
water.109
Two years later, the grantor conveyed the thirty-eight acres
to developers.o10 That conveyance again omitted any reference to
any easement across the State's wildlife preserve."' The
developers demonstrated their knowledge of easements when
they divided the thirty-eight acres into eighteen lots and
expressly reserved a right-of-way for each lot over every other lot
in the subdivision.1 12
Thirty-six years later, after a succession of various owners,
the claimant bought two of the eighteen lots." The claimant
accessed the lots by car over a gravel road running across the
State's wildlife preserve.'14 Although the claimant owned a boat
and could access the property via public boat launch, the
claimant demanded vehicle access. 1 5 When the State put a gate
across its road, the claimant sued seeking a permanent interest
in the use of the State's land bisecting the wildlife preserve."16
The claimant argued that the 1959 deed created an implied
easement over the State's land because otherwise the grantor's
retained property would not have vehicular access. 1 7 In granting
the easement, the court looked to a nineteenth century case that
justified implied easements when essential to the "enjoyment of
the principal thing conveyed.""' In fact, the court's description of
the policy motivating its ruling stemmed from three nineteenth
plant. Halfway Pond is one of the most pristine spruce-lined ponds in Essex
County.").
10' See Berge, 915 A.2d at 190.
1os See id.
109 See id.
no See id.
n. See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See id.
u1 See id.
11 See id. at 191.
118 Id. (quoting Smith v. Higbee, 12 Vt. 113, 123 (1840)).
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century cases." 9 "The real lesson of these cases, however, lies in
the nature of the property interest protected. . . . '[S]ince the
easement is based on social considerations encouraging land use,
its scope ought to be sufficient for the dominant owner to have
the reasonable enjoyment of his land for all lawful purposes.' "120
It did not matter that the original parties did not create an
easement thirty-six years earlier in 1959. It did not matter that
the claimant bought the property knowing it lacked vehicular
access. It did not matter: (1) that the claimant paid nothing and
the State received no compensation for a valuable and
irrevocable real property interest; (2) that the claimant could
access his property by water; and, most importantly, (3) that the
servient estate was a wildlife preserve. The court blithely
mentions in a footnote that "some seventeen contractors" had cut
across the wildlife preserve to develop the claimant's parcel. 121
And what of the remaining sixteen lots? The owners of those
lots were not parties to the litigation, but presumably their lots
also lacked automobile access. Would each be entitled to his or
her own easement over the wildlife preserve?'22
Hundreds of "modern" easement decisions rest, at least in
part, on nineteenth-century pro-development policy. Berge is but
one example. In Johnson v. Suttles, another example, the court
relied on "Oklahoma's express policy of land utilization" to award
an easement to the claimant where the claimant could easily
access his property but could not easily access all of his
property.2 3 A creek winding through his land made the upper
n' See id. at 192 (citing Willey v. Thwing, 34 A. 428, 428-29 (1896)
(acknowledging existence of easement where "necessary to the enjoyment of the
land"); Wiswell v. Minogue, 57 Vt. 616, 621 (1885) (holding that easement arises
from the "necessity of a right of way to the reasonable use and enjoyment of land");
Higbee, 12 Vt. at 123).
120 Berge, 915 A.2d at 192 (quoting Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 979,
979-80 (Vt. 1983)).
121 Id. at 193 n.3.
122 Ironically, the Court insists that it not be constrained by antiquated common
law precepts. See id. at 194-95. Older cases held that access to property by water
affords owners sufficient use and enjoyment of their land. See id. at 191. Rejecting
this precedent "in light of current modes of transportation," the court pontificated
that "[wie should not freeze the common law in time." Id. at 194-95. But the policy
itself, the justification for court's creation of an easement where it otherwise did not
exist, is clearly founded upon outdated maxim. Id.
123 Johnson v. Suttles, 227 P.3d 664, 666, 669 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).
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portion of the tract "difficult" to access. 2 4 Pointing out that the
defendants were "absentee landowners," the claimant sued for a
permanent easement across the defendants' land to ease the
difficulty of reaching the upper portion of his land.12 5 In granting
an easement across the "absentee landowner's" property, the
court admitted that it was "influenced largely by considerations
of public policy in favor of land utilization."12 6 "If the necessity of
an easement is such that without it the land cannot be effectively
used, nothing less than explicit language in the conveyance
negating the creation of the easement will prevent its
implication."2 7
In Lobato v. Taylor, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en
banc cited nineteenth-century case law to "imply a grant of such
easement where it is especially necessary to the enjoyment of the
dominant estate."'2 8 In Lobato, successors in title to an 1844
Mexican land grant demanded access to the Taylor Ranch for
hunting, fishing, recreation, grazing, and timber.12 9 In granting a
prescriptive easement, an easement by estoppel, and an
easement by implied grant, the court reiterated that the law
serves to facilitate the use of land, not its preservation.13 0
In Hunker v. Whitacre-Greer Fireproofing Co., the owner of
2,000 acres granted a recreational easement to a hunting club for
the sole purpose of fox hunting.13 1  When the land owner-a
member of the hunting club-joined a faction that split from the
club, both entities claimed the right to hunt foxes on the 2,000
acres. 3 2 Could the easement holder exclude the landowner from
also hunting foxes? The trial court said yes, citing evidence that
two clubs hunting on 2,000 acres "would diminish, or totally
eliminate, the quarry being hunted."13 3  The appellate court
reversed.134  The issue of whether the easement holder could
124 Id. at 666.
125 See id.
126 Id. at 669 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 476 cmt. g (1944)).
17 Id. (citation omitted).
128 Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 953 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting Yunker v.
Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 554 (Colo. 1872)).
129 See id. at 942-43.
1 See id. at 953.
' Hunker v. Whitacre-Greer Fireproofing Co., 801 N.E.2d 469, 469 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003).
132 See id. at 470.
"I3 Id. at 472.
134 See id.
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exclude the landowners could not be resolved, the court said, by
the fact that too much fox hunting would likely eliminate the
quarry because the question "ha[d] not yet arisen."11 5  In short,
one had to wait until all the foxes had been killed before bringing
a claim.136 Again, the court relied on the policy that land is
meant to be used; the law must allow all parties "to fully utilize
their property."137
Different courts articulate this pro-development policy in
different ways. With regard to implied easements, some courts
use economic terms, stating that land without reasonable access
is "practically valueless."3 s Others point to an owner's inherent
right to enjoy the land, asking whether an easement is
"'reasonably necessary for the enjoyment' of the land."3 Several
courts employ a utilitarian trope to create easements where
necessary: "[T]he long-standing public policy of this
state ... favors utilization of land."140  The utilitarian approach
facilitates whichever result leads to the "beneficial use of [the]
property,"4 or the "use and development" of the land.142
No approach includes a counterbalance for land
conservation. Although the pro-development policy is stated in
varying ways, the focus always promotes land use, a phenomena
clearly illustrated by implied easements.
135 Id.
136 Id. In response to the trial court's concern that two groups hunting foxes on
2,000 acres would wipe out the foxes, and therefore the purpose of the easement,
Justice Waite said that "[aippellants did not agree to supply live foxes or well-rested
foxes or, for that matter, any foxes at all. The easement agreement merely allows
appellees the right to hunt for any foxes that happen to be on the appellant's
property." Id. at 474 (Waite, P.J., concurring).
13 Id.
138 See, e.g., Cobb v. Daugherty, 693 S.E.2d 800, 809 (W. Va. 2010) (quoting
Crotty v. New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co., 78 S.E. 233, 234 (W. Va. 1913)).
139 See, e.g., Helms v. Tullis, 398 So. 2d 253, 255 (Ala. 1981).
140 McCormick v. Schubring, 672 N.W.2d 63, 69 (Wis. 2003) (citing Dillman v.
Hoffman, 38 Wis. 559, 874 (1875)); see also United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348,
1353 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that easements of necessity are "founded in a public
policy favoring utilization of land").
141 Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 490-91 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); see also
Murphy v. Burch, 205 P.3d 289, 292-93 (Cal. 2009).
142 Hewitt v. Meaney, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Murphy,
205 P.3d at 298; Reese v. Borghi, 30 Cal. Rptr. 868, 872 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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B. Implied Easements
Contracting parties do not agree to create implied
easements; the law fabricates the easement. 4 3  Traditionally,
courts are loath to "rewrite" private agreements,'" especially
those involving the transfer of land.'4 ' Thus, the rewriting of a
land conveyance to create an inheritable interest in real property
that materially burdens one party while awarding a windfall to
the other is remarkable in itself. To reach this result, courts
imply that the contracting parties intended to create an
easement when they in fact did not.146 What enables courts to do
this? Courts rely on a "presumption [that] has been
characterized as somewhat of a fiction employed to serve the
public policy to promote land use." 47
1. Required Elements
Implied easements-easements created by operation of law-
generally fall into two categories:148 easements by necessity and
easements by implied grant.' 4  Some courts have muddled the
distinctions because both types require the creation of two or
143 See generally Wolf v. Owens, 172 P.3d 124, 128 (Mont. 2007) (quoting Hoyem
Trust v. Galt, 968 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Mont. 1998)) ("The way of necessity arises when
the strong public policy against shutting off a tract of land and thus rendering it
unusable gives rise to a fictional intent defeating any such restraint."); BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 92, § 4:5 (describing the policy justifying the law's implication of an
easement as a "legal fiction").
'" Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 154 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va. 1967) ("We are
loathe ... to declare invalid the formal undertakings of parties for ... vague reasons
of public policy."); see also Gen. Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 703 F. Supp.
637, 649 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("[Tlhe Court is loath to rewrite a contract term
expressly agreed to."), rev'd on other grounds, 915 F.2d 1038 (6th Cir. 1990); Fortis
Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 649 (Tex. 2007).
"I See Jones v. John S. Stubbs & Assocs., Inc., 221 A.2d 361, 364 (Md. 1966);
O'Connor v. Meskill, 39 A. 1061, 1062 (N.J. Ch. 1898); Hal Taylor Assocs. v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); Panos v. Olsen & Assocs. Const.,
Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 821 (Utah App. 2005).
' Wolf, 172 P.3d at 128.
1' Hewitt, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 351; Wolf, 172 P.3d at 128 (quoting Hoyem Trust,
968 P.2d at 1139) ("The way of necessity arises when the strong public policy against
shutting off a tract of land and thus rendering it unusable gives rise to a fictional
intent defeating any such restraint.").
'oSee BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 4:2.
19 Easements by implied grant are also called easements by implied
reservation, easements by prior existing use and easements implied from quasi
easements. See id.; Note, The Creation of Easements by Implication, 13 IOWA L. REV.
74, 75 (1927).
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more tracts from what was once a single tract.150 However, the
similarities end there. Easements by necessity require a "need"
at severance for an easement to benefit either the parcel
transferred or the parcel retained.'5' Easements by implied
grant require that the common owner, before severance, exercise
apparent and continuous use of part of the land to benefit
another part (quasi-easement), and a need at severance for the
preexisting use to continue for the benefit of either the parcel
transferred or the parcel retained.152
Implied easements are not, per se, bad law. While
overutilized due to an outmoded pro-development policy, a few
arguments buttress the continued use of implied easements.
Easements by necessity, for example, protect landowners from
the specter of valueless property.'5 If the property is landlocked,
if it is wholly inaccessible, what good is it? As our English
progenitors put it, "[Afnyone who grants a thing to someone is
understood to grant that without which the thing cannot be or
exist."'54 If the parties to a land conveyance expressly envision a
use that requires ready access, and the purchase price reflects
the value of a fully accessible tract, it seems fair to imply an
otherwise undocumented easement. It seems fair, because it
reflects the intent of the contracting parties.
2. Overbroad and Expanding
Conversely, a host of arguments suggest that the current law
of implied easements is too simplistic and far-reaching. First,
modern public sentiment underscores that un-used land is not
valueless, but is in fact more and more valuable.'5' As mentioned
150 Canali v. Satre, 688 N.E.2d 351, 353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("Defendants,
however, confuse the requirements for easements created by necessity with those
created by prior use."); Howley v. Chaffee, 93 A. 120, 122 (Vt. 1915) ("Much
confusion of judicial thought has resulted from a failure to distinguish between ways
of necessity and ways arising under this latter doctrine-a confusion, it must be
admitted, from which our own cases have not wholly escaped."); Cobb v. Daugherty,
693 S.E.2d 800, 807 (W. Va. 2010) ("The attorneys for the Cobbs and Daughertys, as
well as the circuit court, appear to have confused and intermingled the standards for
both easement types in the jury instructions.").
... See Cobb, 693 S.E.2d at 808.
152 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 4:2.
.s James W. Simonton, Ways by Necessity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 581 (1925).
154 See id. at 572 (citing Lord Darcy v. Askwith, (1617) 80 Eng. Rep. 380 (K.B.)
381 (tracing the common law history of easements by necessity).
155 See Klass, supra note 43, at 284.
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above, several surveys reflect popular support for preserving
undeveloped land. 15 6 A recent California decision calls attention
to a distinct market for landlocked parcels.'"' That court argued
that courts ought not "intrude into even a 'market' as distinctive
as this one."' The fact that a landowner has no access or
restricted access does not condemn the property as worthless.
And what about instances where tract isolation is intended?
If the parties to a deed want to keep a tract landlocked, will the
court honor that intention? Several cases illustrate that such
transactions are not as rare as perhaps expected.5 9 Curiously,
the strong policy promoting land development often trumps even
the parties' clear intent to keep property landlocked.6 0
Others criticize modern implied easement law because of its
breadth. Courts routinely award an easement to a grantee who
lacks access to his or her land.'6' But to what access is he
or she entitled? Early courts held foot and horseback access
15 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
157 See Murphy v. Burch, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2007), affd, 205
P.3d 289 (Cal. 2009).
158 Id.
15' See, e.g., Galvin v. Gaffney, 24 F. Supp. 2d 223, 232-33 (D. Conn. 1998);
Hewitt v. Meaney, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349, 367 (Ct. App. 1986); Daywalt v. Walker, 31
Cal. Rptr. 899, 902-03 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); B & J Dev. & Inv., Inc. v. Parsons, 887
P.2d 49, 52-53 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 681 P.2d 1010,
1017-18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Luthy v. Keehner, 412 N.E.2d 1091, 1093 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980); O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1043 (Me. 1987); Shpak v. Oletsky,
373 A.2d 1234, 1240-41 (Md. 1977); Orpin v. Morrison, 120 N.E. 183, 183 (Mass.
1918); White v. Landerdahl, 625 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Mont. 1981); Bradley v. Patterson,
435 A.2d 129, 132 (N.H. 1981); Mountain View, Inc. v. Bryson, 336 S.E.2d 432, 433
(N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 579 N.W.2d 583, 587 (N.D. 1998);
Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 974, 977 (Vt. 1983).
160 See, e.g., Galvin, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (holding that the implication of an
easement by necessity could not be defeated by a showing of contrary actual intent
where the parcel was effectively landlocked); B & J Dev. & Inv., Inc., 887 P.2d at 52
(holding that the expectations of one party will not defeat the implication of an
easement on public policy grounds); Bob Daniels & Sons, 681 P.2d at 1018 ("[An
easement arises independently from any contract and may even thwart the intent of
the sellers or purchasers."); Mountain View, Inc., 336 S.E.2d at 433 (holding that the
Statute of Frauds bars parol evidence offered to override the implication of an
easement by necessity); Traders, Inc., 459 A.2d at 978 (holding that public policy
overrides any evidence showing the parties' contrary intent).
161 See, e.g., Riggs v. Bert, 432 S.W.2d 852, 852 (Ark. 1968); Bob Daniels & Sons,
681 P.2d at 1013 ("Few things are as certain as death, taxes and the legal
entanglement that follows a sale of landlocked real estate."); Miller v. Schmitz, 400
N.E.2d 488, 490-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Davis v. Sikes, 151 N.E. 291, 295 (Mass.
1926).
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sufficient. 162 However, contemporary courts reflect contemporary
transportation. 163  Courts even reject access by boat as
unreasonable,1 " awarding easements most often for automobile
access. 165
Although some courts have held that access to a piece of
property by navigable waters negates the "necessity" required for
a way of necessity, the trend since the 1920s has been toward a
more liberal attitude in allowing easements despite access by
water, reflecting a recognition that most people today think in
terms of "driving" rather than "rowing" to work or home.66
The scope of the implied easement can also grow with the
easement holder's use. In the nineteenth-century case, Whittier
v. Winkley, the court said that an easement by necessity is
"necessary for all purposes to which the land is adapted" and that
the "necessity is originally coextensive with all the lawful uses of
which the . . . lot is capable."' If the servient land is a wildlife
preserve, as in Berge, can an easement holder run eighteen
162 Smith v. Worn, 28 P. 944 (Cal. 1892); Roush v. Roush, 55 N.E. 1017, 1019
(Ind. 1900); Va. Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 101 S.E. 326, 328 (Va. 1919).
16s See Ashby v. Maechling, 229 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Mont. 2010) (stating that
implied easements are "not limited to the precise uses and prevailing technology at
the time of severance").
16 See Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 889 A.2d 403, 415-16 (Md. 2006)
(concluding easement of necessity arose notwithstanding access via water); Cale v.
Wanamaker, 296 A.2d 329, 333 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972); Berge v. State, 915
A.2d 189, 192-95 (Vt. 2006) (determining that "access to navigable water is
generally not legally sufficient, standing alone, to defeat a finding of necessity"). But
see Welch v. State, 908 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Me. 2006) (reiterating "our rule . . . that
land accessible by navigable water is not entitled to an easement by necessity");
Murch v. Nash, 861 A.2d 645, 651-52 (Me. 2004). See generally E.L. Kellett,
Annotation, Easements: Way by Necessity Where Property Is Accessible by Navigable
Water, 9 A.L.R.3d 600, 602 (1966).
" Carr v. Barnett, 580 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Ashby, 229 P.3d at
1218 ("[M]odern vehicle access and utility services may be allowed as part of an
easement by necessity even though the easement arose as a legal matter before the
general use of such improvements."); Berge, 915 A.2d at 192 ("We depend on roads
and automobiles for transporting not only our family and friends, but all our basic
necessities to and from our homes . . .
166 See Cale, 296 A.2d at 333.
' Whittier v. Winkley 62 N.H. 338 (1882); see Myers v. Dunn, 49 Conn. 71
(1881) ("The owner of land has a right to the most profitable use, the most beneficial
enjoyment thereof.... He may erect buildings and raise grain upon, and dig ores
beneath it; and when, by their conveyance to the defendant's grantor the
administrators imposed, in favor of the land granted, a way of necessity over the
locus in quo, they are to be presumed to have intentionally done it for any or all of
these purposes . . . .").
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wheelers, dump trucks, and cement trucks over the easement
(and through the wildlife preserve) day and night? If the
dominant holder's land supports such use, the answer is yes. 1 8
3. Strict Versus Reasonable Necessity
If the traditional law of implied easements sweeps too
broadly, the current trend only extends its breadth. In other
words, many courts award easements by necessity for a merely
reasonable rather than a strict need.' "The more modern rule
seems to be that the rule of a strict necessity applicable to an
implied reservation or grant of an easement is not limited to one
of absolute necessity, but to reasonable necessity. ... "10 This
distinction between strict necessity and reasonable necessity is
important because it illustrates the competing policies informing
each approach.
Strict necessity more closely tracks the contracting parties'
intent. The parties' presumed intent to create an easement
should be inferred in only the most compelling circumstances."'
As a court in 1906 put it:
[Strict necessity] will not exist when a man can get to his
property over his own land. That the way over his own land is
too steep or too narrow or that other and like difficulties exist
does not alter the case, and it is only when there is no way
through his own land that a grantee can claim a right over that
of his grantor.172
168 See McFadden v. Sein, 88 P.3d 740, 743 (Idaho 2004) ("[Ulse of a general
easement may be enlarged beyond the purposes originally required at the time the
easement was created, so long as that use is reasonable and necessary and is
consistent with the normal development of the land."); Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d
275, 276, 278 (Iowa 2000) (interpreting express easement "to drive teams" as
allowing "ingress and egress for modem vehicular traffic, including farm tractors
and implements"); Berge, 915 A.2d at 192. See generally Hunter C. Carroll,
Property-Easements by Necessity: What Level of Necessity Is Required?, 19 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 475, 477 (1995) (noting that "the property owner is entitled as a
matter of public policy to its use for all lawful purposes").
16 See Michael V. Hernandez, Restating Implied, Prescriptive, and Statutory
Easements, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 75, 80 & n.21 (2005); ELY & BRUCE, supra
note 92, § 4:6.
170 Cobb v. Daugherty, 693 S.E.2d 800, 810 n.10 (W. Va. 2010).
171 See Simonton, supra note 153, at 580.
172 Bully Hill Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bruson, 87 P. 237, 238 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1906).
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Only when a tract is wholly inaccessible is it more palatable
to presume that the contracting parties intended to include an
easement in the transaction because the property would be
significantly devalued otherwise.17 3
By contrast, most modern courts grant easements when an
owner already has access, but the access is deemed too difficult or
unreasonable. 17 4  This standard reflects the public policy
theory.1 5 "Under the public policy theory, an easement should be
implied in any situation in which limited access to one of the
parcels prevents the owner from making full and productive use
of the land."11 6 As a result, the policy favoring land development
and therefore favoring an owner's reasonable access justifies
creation of implied easements even when a parcel is already
accessible. If a landowner's pre-existing access is too narrow,"'
too steep,178 too marshy,'7 9 or if it requires a longer distance, 10 a
173 See, e.g., Burdess v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 646, 653 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Applegate v. Ota, 194 Cal. Rptr. 331, 338 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Carroll v. Meredith,
59 S.W.3d 484, 492-93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). Courts also justify the strict-necessity
rule as promoting certainty and stability of titles. See Burling v. Leiter, 262 N.W.
388, 391 (Mich. 1935); Duff v. Matthews, 311 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Tex. 1958).
14 See, e.g., Nunes v. Meadowbrook Dev. Co., 824 A.2d 421, 425-26 (R.I. 2003);
Cellco P'ship v. Shelby Cnty., 172 S.W.3d 574, 592-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005);
Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Res. Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976); Davis v.
Henning, 462 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va. 1995); Carstensen v. Chrisland Corp., 442 S.E.2d
660, 663-64 (Va. 1994).
175 ELY & BRUCE, supra note 92, § 4:10 ("This test is more closely aligned with
the public policy theory of easements of necessity.").
176 Id.; see Simonton, supra note 153, at 580.
177 See, e.g., Anderson v. Lee, 182 N.W. 380, 381-82 (Iowa 1921) (holding that
landowner's strip ten feet wide and eighty rods in length from his property to the
public highway was not sufficient access to his property to bar condemnation of a
private road over a neighbor's land); Hart v. Deering, 111 N.E. 37, 39 (Mass. 1916)
(finding five feet and nine inches as too narrow); Henderson v. La Capra, 307 S.W.2d
59, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (too narrow for access by truck); Lobdell v.
Leichtenberger, 658 A.2d 399, 403 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
18 See, e.g., Bean v. Nelson, 817 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Ark. 1991); Wagner v.
Fairlamb, 379 P.2d 165, 168-69 (Colo. 1963) (en banc); Beeson v. Phillips, 702 P.2d
1244, 1247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (no access baring "necessity" finding when lower
portions of lot were separated by steep bluff 125 to 175 feet high).
1' See, e.g., Franklin v. Boatright, 399 So. 2d 1132, 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Stuckey v. Collins, 464 So. 2d 346, 348-49 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Beck v.
Mangels, 640 A.2d 236, 242, 246-47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
so See, e.g., McGowin Inv. Co. v. Johnstone, 306 So. 2d 286, 288 (Ala. Civ. App.
1974); Houston v. Hanby, 232 S.W. 930, 932 (Ark. 1921) (although landowner had
access to a public road by traveling 2 1/2 miles, the court found it impractical for the
landowner to get timber from his land over this alternate route); Wagstaff v.
Sublette Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 53 P.3d 79, 84 (Wyo. 2002).
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difficult route, 18 1 or considerable expense,18 2 courts will create
easements by operation of law-all under the mantra of land
development.
4. Common Owner Requirement
Those defending the modern approach to implied easements
claim that the doctrine is not overbroad because both easements
by necessity and easements by implied grant are limited by the
requirement that the land must originally be held by a common
owner. 183  The common ownership requirement, they argue,
limits the implication of easements "to cases where it is most
equitable to imply such servitudes." 84 Courts will not create, for
example, implied easements over a third party's land. 8 1
But common ownership, itself, is an obscure requirement.
Courts diverge on whether the element is met when the common
owner: leased part of the land,' did not own it in fee simple,1s'
1 See Custom Warehouse, Inc. v. Lenertz, 975 F. Supp. 1240, 1250-51 (E.D.
Mo. 1997). See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Way of Necessity over
Another's Land, Where a Means of Access Does Exist, but Is Claimed To Be
Inadequate, Inconvenient, Difficult, or Costly, 10 A.L.R. 4th 447 (1981).
182 See, e.g., Daley v. Hughes, 4 So. 3d 364, 370 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that "the easement was reasonably necessary because the ... only alternative route
was by constructing a bridge across the creek at a cost of at least $10,000"); Daniel v.
Fox, 917 S.W.2d 106, 113 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (citing cases where "easements of
necessity were sustained upon a showing that the cost of construction of a way over
one's land as a means of access to a highway would require expense out of proportion
to the value of the land").
'" Hurlocker v. Medina, 878 P.2d 348, 351 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Koonce v. Brite
Estate, 663 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 1984); Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Res. Corp.,
555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976); Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 974, 979 (Vt.
1983); see ELY & BRUCE, supra note 92, § 4:7 ("Because the public policy theory
applies to all landlocked property, the common ownership requirement may be seen
as a means to limit the implication of easements of necessity . ....
14 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 4:7).
" See Burlison v. United States, 533 F.3d 419, 426-28 (6th Cir. 2008); Teague
v. Raines, 605 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting Boullioun v.
Constantine, 54 S.W.2d 986, 987 (Ark. 1932)) (noting that easement of necessity
cannot be established over land that was not in common ownership with landlocked
parcel); Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
.88 See First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 905, 906
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (stating that ownership standard is not satisfied when a party
owned one parcel in fee and held a leasehold interest or a life estate in the other
parcel).
18' See Kennedy v. Bedenbaugh, 572 S.E.2d 452, 454-55 (S.C. 2002).
896
EASEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
owned the land concurrently with another,18  and when the
common owner is a governmental entity.8 9 Moreover, how far
back down the chain of title can a claimant go to find a common
owner sufficient to support an implied easement? If the common
owner can be the government, every landowner in the United
States can arguably trace ownership back to a common owner,
thus eviscerating the requirement altogether. 190 This, of course,
presupposes that the common owner need not be the immediate
grantor, "but is any common source in the chain of title to the two
estates."91
To illustrate, several claimants have successfully traced
common ownership of their particular lot to government
ownership-well over 100 years prior to the dispute.192  In
Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 93 the
claimant traced common ownership back to the "checkerboard"
grants offered by the government as inducement to build
railroads.' 94 The court dispenses with the common ownership
requirement in one sentence: "Prior to the Northern Pacific
Railroad land grant in 1864 the United States held title to all of
the land."'95 In Moores v. Walsh, a 1995 case, the court looked
118 years up the chain of title to find common ownership in the
federal government. 9 6  In Kellogg v. Garcia, a 2002 case, the
court backpedals to 1878 in order to find a common owner-
again, the federal government. 9 7
's See Riffle v. Worthen, 939 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ark. 1997) ("The joint ownership
of one of the two tracts of land does not meet this requirement."); Lee v. Sch. Dist.
No. R-1 of Jefferson Cnty., 435 P.2d 232, 236 (Colo. 1967); Swieton v. Landoch, 435
N.E.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Garvin v. State, 116 Misc. 408, 415-16,
190 N.Y.S. 143, 147-48 (Ct. Cl. 1921) ("[O]ne cannot have a right of way of necessity
over land which the grantor never owned[,] except as tenant in common.").
18' See generally ELY & BRUCE, supra note 92, § 4:7 ("Controversy exists as to
whether governmental ownership of both tracts fulfills the unity-of-title standard.").
' See Kinscherffv. United States, 586 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1978); Utah v.
Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Utah 1979); Kellogg v. Garcia, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
817, 826 n.5 (Ct. App. 2002); Moores v. Walsh, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 391 (Ct. App.
1995).
191 Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, 404 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
192 Kinscherff, 586 F.2d at 161; Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 1000; Moores, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 390.
193 496 F. Supp. 880 (D. Mont. 1980).
' Id. at 885.
195 Id.
196 Moores, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391.
197 Kellogg v. Garcia, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 820-21 (Ct. App. 2002).
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Why allow a claimant to dig back 124 years to the
government's original ownership and through a series of previous
owners who themselves did not assert this claim?
Unsurprisingly, the Kellogg court relied on the government's
nineteenth-century land use policy."' "During most of the 19th
century, our public land policy was basically one of disposal [of
lands owned by the United States] into non-Federal ownership to
encourage settlement and development of the country.""
The common ownership requirement is inconsistently
applied and, when courts allow claimants latitude to prove that
common ownership existed over a century ago, it is a toothless
restriction.
C. Prescriptive Easements
Like implied easements, the historical preference for land
development also informs prescriptive easements. Prescriptive
easements arise when a person uses another's property without
permission for a certain time and the owner fails to prevent the
use. 200  The interloper's use of the owner's land effectively
transfers an inheritable property right to the interloper. 2 01 This
transfer of property rights from the title owner to the interloper
based on land use roughly parallels the doctrine of adverse
possession.202
Courts sometimes wrestle over whether the interloper's
actions confer title by adverse possession or confer a right to use
the land by prescriptive easement.20 3 Both doctrines reflect the
198 See id. at 826.
199 Id. (alteration in original).
200 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1.
201 Romualdo P. Eclavea et al., Annotation, 28A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM
Easements § 8 (2011).
202 See Tenala, Ltd. v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114, 1119 (Alaska 1996); Kunkel v.
Fisher, 23 P.3d 1128, 1130-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that they are "often
treated as equivalent doctrines"); Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, 2 CORPUS JURIS
SECUNDUM Adverse Possession § 2 (2011); see also John R. Kennel, Annotation, 25
AM. JUR. Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 45 (2d 2011). But see 17
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, 17 WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES Real
Estate: Property Law § 2.7 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that prescription and adverse
possession are interchangeable in Washington but for some differences).
203 See, e.g., Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Ass'n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 138, 142 (Ct.
App. 2004); Claussen v. City of Lauderdale, 681 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004); Home of Econ. v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 736 N.W.2d 780, 784-85 (N.D.
2007).
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philosophy that patterns of land possession and use should be
encouraged and that an industrious occupant should be rewarded
at the expense of an idle owner.2 04
1. Required Elements
Generally, a claimant seeking a prescriptive easement must
show open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, and
adverse use of another's land for the period of prescription.205
Some courts also require a showing that the use was exclusive,206
but exclusivity does not require that the claimant is the only one
that uses the easement.20 7 Use by the title owner, for example,
does not defeat exclusivity in some cases.2 08 Courts have applied
these elements inconsistently,2 0 9 prompting inquiry into the
origin of prescriptive easement law. The origin, however, is
unclear at best.
2. Doctrinal Origin
"Much of the misunderstanding and confusion that
surrounds the court's treatment of prescription comes from the
historical fog out of which the doctrine emerged."210 Why was it
originally recognized? What philosophy did it honor? Some
commentators trace prescription back to the Roman law of
Usucapio, 2 11 others suggest it derived from local custom. 2 12  In
204 See Kunkel, 23 P.3d at 1130-31; Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest
in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 669-70 (1988).
205 See, e.g., Aaron v. Dunham, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 35 (Ct. App. 2006); Sjuts v.
Granville Cemetery Ass'n, 719 N.W.2d 236, 240 (Neb. 2006); Kunkel, 23 P.3d at
1130.
206 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256, 1265-66 (10th Cir.
2007); Ammer v. Ariz. Water Co., 818 P.2d 190, 194 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Page v.
Bloom, 584 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Hoffman v. United Iron & Metal Co.,
671 A.2d 55, 64-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
207 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:23 (stating that exclusivity does not
mean the claimant is the only one using the easement; "use shared with the owner of
the servient estate generally may form the basis for a prescriptive easement").
208 See id.
209 See Patch v. Baird, 435 A.2d 690, 691 (Vt. 1981) ("The elements of adverse
use are not always expressed in the cases in the same language, and confusion
sometimes results.") (citations omitted); Kunkel, 23 P.3d at 1130 n.2 ("Many cases
conflate various elements as different sub-components of the same element.").
210 2 GEORGE W. THOMPSON & LEONARD A. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 337, at 158 (1980).
211 See William B. Stoebuck, The Fiction of Presumed Grant, 15 U. KAN. L. REV.
17, 18 (1966).
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early England, a claimant seeking land rights based on
prescription had to show he used the property since time
immemorial.213
Without benefit of documentation, immemorial use proved
ownership. Before 1275, immemorial use was either beyond
living memory or at least back to the Norman Conquest.214 In
1275, Parliament shortened the limit of legal memory to a date
certain: 1189, beyond which English law presumed man's
memory could not reliably extend.2 1 5
But year after year, 1189 became increasingly distant, so
English common law developed a fictional justification called
"lost grant."21 6 Rather than award prescriptive rights due to a
claimant's immemorial use, the law awarded prescriptive rights
based on the number of years of use.2 17 If a particular use had
long existed-but not necessarily since 1189-it was presumed
that a grant authorizing such use had been made, but that the
grant itself had been lost.2 18
"American courts generally adopted the lost grant doctrine
as part of the common law."2 19  This presumption-that
continued use reflects a fictional grant that was then lost-has
propped up the law of prescriptive easements in America for
some time.2 20 In light of the Statute of Frauds and modern
212 See A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 110 (2d ed. 1986).
213 See Stoebuck, supra note 211, at 19.
214 See id.
215 See id.; BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1 ("English law first presumed that
a use that had continued 'during time whereof the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary' had a lawful origin.").
216 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 cmt. g (2000); BRUCE &
ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1.
217 Stoebuck, supra note 211, at 19-20. Twenty years was the generally accepted
limitation period originally set for prescriptive claims. See id. at 21.
218 See Crigger v. Fla. Power Corp., 436 So. 2d 937, 941-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (reviewing development of lost grant fiction); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 152-56 (Utah 1946). For a more in depth discussion of
the court's holding in Big Cottonwood as it relates to the fiction of the "lost grant,"
see Mark A. Clawson, Prescription Adrift in a Sea of Servitudes: Postmodernism and
the Lost Grant, 43 DUKE L.J. 845 (1994).
219 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1. See generally Carter v. Walker, 65 So. 170
(Ala. 1914); Jessup v. Bard, 201 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1947); Marr v. Hemenny, 297 N.W.
504 (Mich. 1941); Wilson v. Williams, 87 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1939); Ward v. Warren, 82
N.Y. 265 (1880); Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885); Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vt. 503
(1864).
220 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1.
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recording statutes, transferring property interests based on
imaginary agreements that are themselves imagined lost retains
little, if any, relevance.2 2 1 Such a thin and antiquated legal
fiction would have eroded the use of prescriptive easements long
ago but for the fact that prescription, like adverse possession,
advances an overarching policy promoting land use and
development.2 2  As courts began to reject the "lost grant"
rationale, they analogized prescription to adverse possession,
grafting adverse possession's policies and rationales to
prescriptive easements.2 23
3. Landowner Diligence/ Certainty of Title
In light of this dubious history, some call for abolition of
prescriptive easements,224 but proponents contend that
prescription can be justified.22 5 For one, the threat of
prescription encourages landowner diligence.226 But how is
landowner diligence beneficial? Presumably, diligence connotes
knowledge of property boundaries and vigilance as to all
permitted uses. A vigilant owner builds fences, puts up signs,
installs lights and often introduces other means of property
protection. An absentee owner alters little, if anything. As a
result, it is more likely that a diligent landowner can prevent
prescription through such vigilance. But it is circular to suggest
that prescription is justified by landowner diligence merely
because landowner diligence protects against prescription.
221 See Plaza v. Flak, 81 A.2d 137, 139 (N.J. 1951); Morning Call, Inc. v. Bell
Atl.-Pa., Inc., 761 A.2d 139, 142, 143 & n.7 (Pa. 2000); Hernandez, supra note 169, at
106 ("[T]he fanciful fiction of the lost grant, which bears no rational relation to
modern property law, should be discarded.").
222 See William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the
Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 79, 83 (1996) ("A review of authorities on the subject does not provide
an exact reason why prescription and adverse possession became part of American
law; although there is little doubt it was a result of the pro development effect of the
doctrines and common law tradition.").
223 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:1 (citing Felgenhauer v. Soni, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 2004); Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 64 (Fla. 1958);
Plaza, 81 A.2d at 139.
224 See Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 222, at 79; Hernandez, supra note 169,
at 105-06.
225 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. c (2000).
226 See id.
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Proponents also claim prescription facilitates certainty of
title. 227 Technical mistakes in land conveyances can be corrected
when an adverse user claims title.228 In such instances
uncertainty from conveyance errors would be solved by
vesting rights in the person who uses the land.2 29 This
simplistic approach, however, betrays the uncertainty that
prescription breeds. Where modern recording statutes seek to
secure confidence in title ownership,23 0 prescription foments
uncertainty.23 1 Whether the disputed tract has been properly
recorded ought to be the first step in any prescription dispute.
As it is, courts subvert the laudable goals of recording
statutes by focusing instead on the adverse claimant and how
long she used the property.2 3 2 This approach destabilizes real
estate transactions by undermining title certainty for buyers and
creditors who justifiably rely on recording statutes.3 Moreover,
the "lost grant" doctrine-which is still recognized in some
jurisdictionS234 -is antithetical to the recording acts.2 3 5  A
227 See 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.10[1] (2011).
228 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. c (2000).
229 See id.
230 See Corwin W. Johnson, Purpose and Scope of Recording Statutes, 47 IOWA L.
REV. 231, 231-33 (1962); Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior
Unrecorded Transferees of Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording
System and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 105, 109 (1988) ("[A] number of
commentators seem to agree that the fundamental goal of any recording system is to
promote the certainty of land titles."); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About
Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 460 n.16 (1996) ("The original
purpose of recording statutes was 'rebuttal of [the] fraud created by possession.' ")
(alteration in original).
231 See generally Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984).
See also Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 222, at 92 (stating the prescription
"represent[s] the generation of animosity between neighbors, a source of damages to
land or loss of land ownership, and the creation of uncertainty for the landowner")
(citations omitted).
232 See Felgenhauer v. Soni, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135, 138 (Ct. App. 2004); Plaza v.
Flak, 81 A.2d 137, 139 (N.J. 1951).
23 See Hernandez, supra note 169, at 108 ("The sole cause of concern for
purchasers or creditors is that prescription is sanctioned by law.").
234 See Stoebuck, supra note 211, at 22-23 (citing Carter v. Walker, 65 So. 170
(Ala. 1914); Jessup v. Bard, 201 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1947); Marr v. Hemenny, 297 N.W.
504 (Mich. 1941); Romans v. Nadler, 14 N.W.2d 482 (Minn. 1944); Wilson v.
Williams, 87 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1939); Ward v. Warren, 82 N.Y. 265 (1880); Telford v.
Stettmund, 235 P.2d 692 (Okla. 1951); Cornett v. Rhudy, 80 Va. 710 (1885); Tracy v.
Atherton, 36 Vt. 503 (1864); Shellow v. Hagen, 101 N.W.2d 694 (Wis. 1960)).
235 See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 374 (3d ed. 1989).
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fictional grant-especially one that is fictionally lost-can never
be recorded and thus can never give anyone record notice.
Awarding adverse claimants prescriptive rights, which
themselves are not recorded, cuts counter to the recording
system.23 6 It is hard to see how the "title curing function"
justifies prescriptive easements.
4. Personhood Theory
Proponents also contend that prescription fulfills
expectations fostered by long use.237 Justice Holmes famously
described the emotional attachment accompanying extended use
of property.
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a
long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your
being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law
can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.
It is only by way of reply to the suggestion that you are
disappointing the former owner, that you refer to his neglect
having allowed the gradual dissociation between himself and
what he claims, and the gradual association of it with another.
If he knows that another is doing acts which on their face show
that he is on the way toward establishing such an association, I
should argue that in justice to that other he was bound at his
peril to find out whether the other was acting under his
permission, to see that he was warned, and, if necessary,
stopped."'
Holmes's quote presumes several facts not essential to a
successful prescription claim. Further, it is outdated.2 3 9 Given
modern recording statutes, prescription disputes ought to be
grounded in who has title rather than who has an expectation of
possession due to continuous trespass. Even with unwitting
trespassers, the presumption should support rather than subvert
236 See Hernandez, supra note 221, at 108.
237 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 cmt. c (2000).
238 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
239 See generally Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse
Possession Reform Act, a Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property
Law, 12 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2004) (proposing a new recording system that would
eliminate adverse possession); Susan Lorde Martin, Adverse Possession: Practical
Realities and an Unjust Enrichment Standard, 37 REAL EST. L.J. 133 (2008)
(criticizing older view prioritizing possession over ownership).
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the recording statutes.24 0 In other words, recording statutes give
notice to buyers of title ownership; such notice ought to extend to
adverse claimants. Why burden the title owner who paid for the
property and properly recorded it with the additional duty to
keep vigil over the land when public records, many of which are
electronically available, alert the world to a parcel's boundaries
and ownership?
If recorded title itself is unclear or erroneous, perhaps a
claimant's expectation derived from decades of uninterrupted use
merits a prescriptive easement.2 41 If so, Holmes's justification
retains some relevance-but only when a claimant acts according
to an erroneous deed or other document that has been
recorded.242
Holmes's justification also leapfrogs basic fairness. He
bypasses purposeful trespass in a blithe phrase when he
condones a prescriptive claim "however you came by it."24 3 Even
a claimant who knows the property belongs to another, according
to Holmes, can take that property by prescription or adverse
possession.244 The popular uproar in Boulder, Colorado over a
recent adverse possession claim indicates that basic fairness
remains a critical factor.245
In McLean v. Kirlin ,246 a retired judge and his wife, herself a
land-use lawyer, claimed ownership over a chunk of their
neighbor's million-dollar residential lot by adverse possession.24 7
The landowner alleged that the retired judge and his wife
leveraged their expertise in the law and intentionally sought to
240 See Martin, supra note 239, at 147-52.
241 See, e.g., Thompson v. Dypvik, 220 Cal. Rptr. 46, 51-52 (Ct. App. 1985).
242 Cf Will Saxe, Note, When "Comprehensive" Prescriptive Easements Overlap
Adverse Possession: Shifting Theories of "Use" and "Possession," 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 175, 196-97 (2006) (proposing claimant demonstrate "good faith belief in the
right to use" before prescriptive easement could be awarded).
243 Holmes, supra note 238.
244 See id.
245 See generally Don Kirlin & Susie Kirlin, Heartfelt Thanks!,
LANDGRABBER.ORG (Nov. 19, 2008, 11:00 AM), http://www.landgrabber.org/.
246 This dispute was settled in trial court, but the author refers those interested
to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law under the following style
and case number: Minute Order Re: Bench Trial, McLean v. Kirlin, No. 06 CV 982
(Dist. Ct. Boulder Cnty. Colo. filed Oct. 4, 2006).
247 See id. at 1-5.
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take valuable land using adverse possession.2 48 Public outcry
garnered national attention and prompted the Colorado
Legislature to overhaul the state's adverse possession law: The
case "prompted public protests; death threats against McLean
and Stevens ... [and] spurred changes to Colorado's adverse
possession law."249
Finally, prescriptive easements provoke litigation and
neighborhood conflict.2 50 Unable to rely on recorded title, feuding
landowners must often sue to resolve prescription claims-
claims that rest on multiple fact-intensive elements and that
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Property law, in some
form, should encourage peaceful interaction among neighbors.25 1
Because courts have found that prescriptive easements
"encourage [ ] expensive litigation between neighbors to either
obtain some legal injunction to stop the use of the land, or obtain
a legal ruling definitively establishing an easement," the doctrine
fails to engender the peaceful co-existence promoted by the rule
of law.252
248 See Jaclyn Allen, Couple Accused of Faking Evidence in Boulder Land
Dispute, DENVER NEWS (Feb. 14, 2008, 6:56 PM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/
news/15307055/detail.html; Robert Siegel, Landowner Fights Squatter's Right to
Vacant Lot (National Public Radio Broadcast Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.
npr.org/templates/transcriptitranscript.php?storyd=17105532.
249 Kirlin & Kirlin, supra note 245; see also Heath Urie, Adverse Possession Bill
Set for Senate Committee, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (Mar. 4, 2008, 3:43 AM),
http://www.dailycamera.com/ongoing-coverage/ci_13137940.
250 See Saxe, supra note 242, at 201 ("[T]he doctrine of prescriptive easements
actually increases litigation by forcing land owners to bring suit when a trespass has
occurred."); Lewis J. Soffer & David E. Harris, Ten Years After Silacci, Mehdizadeh
and Scruby, Neighbors in California Are Still Behaving Like the "Hatfields and
McCoys," MILLER & STARR REAL EST. NEWSALERT, July 2006, at 417, 417.
251 See, e.g., O'Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561, 585-86 (W. Va. 2010) ("Easements
by prescription are not favored in the law, because they essentially reward a
trespasser and allow the taking of another's property without compensation. In this
modern age, it does little to encourage civility between neighbors to have a rule
whereby a landowner, who allows his neighbor to use some part of his land, runs the
risk that the use may transmogrify into a legally-binding prescriptive use merely by
the passage of time. Such a rule, as this case demonstrates, encourages expensive
litigation between neighbors to either obtain some legal injunction to stop the use of
the land, or obtain a legal ruling definitively establishing an easement. Worse, such
a rule might impel neighbors to resort to aggressive, extra-legal acts in defense of
their property.").
252 Id. at 586.
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Perhaps surprisingly, given the doctrinal history, outmoded
policy justifications, and popular disdain, all fifty states
recognize prescriptive easements in some form.253 In fact,
prescriptive easements are becoming easier to claim because the
required time of prescription is becoming shorter and shorter 2 54
and because the Restatement dilutes the adversity element,
furthering the reach of prescriptive easements.25 5 Moreover, due
to the similarities in the two doctrines, claimants can often
achieve the benefits of ownership under prescription without
having to meet the more stringent adverse possession
requirements.n2
Many problems plague the doctrine of prescriptive
easements. None of the rationales offered to support
prescription-(1) promoting land use; (2) honoring a "lost grant,"
(3) curing title errors, (4) encouraging landowner diligence; or
(5) facilitating expectations-account for conservation or
preservation. If anything, "absentee landowners" are disparaged
in light of "our society's traditional preference for the
development of land."257 As discussed below, use of prescriptive
easements should be receding not growing.
D. Express Easements
With implied and prescriptive easements, the pro-
development or anti-wilderness bias most readily appears in the
creation of the easement-when the court fabricates property
rights by operation of law rather than by agreement of the
parties. Express easements, by contrast, raise no question as to
the creation of the property interest. Rather, disputes hinge
on problems that arise after creation of the easement,
including scope of the easement,25 8 interference by the servient
estate owner,259 modified use by the dominant estate owner,o
abandonment, 6 1 and relocation of the easement.2 62
25. See Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 222, at 106-10.
254 See id. at 92-93 ("Recent trends show a shortening of the period, which
lessens the landowner's opportunity to discover the adverse possessor.").
255 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 5:11.
256 See Saxe, supra note 242, at 196.
257 Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks
Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 942 (1996); see BRUCE & ELY, supra
note 92, § 5:1. See generally 4 POWELL, supra note 227.
" See, e.g., Mason v. Garrison, 998 P.2d 531, 535 (Mont. 2000).
259 See, e.g., id. at 540; Palmer v. Soloe, 601 A.2d 1250, 1252 (Pa. 1992).
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1. Doctrinal Origin
Before dissecting some of these areas, it is insightful to ask
why the law recognizes express easements at all. Certainly,
freedom of contract justifies enforcement of express easements.
Allowing private agreements on property use and disposal is a
bedrock legal and economic principle.2 63 But why bind
subsequent landowners? What rationale supports enforcement of
easements generation after generation? Doesn't the same
laissez-faire economic model that justifies freedom of contract
require maximum property alienation?2 64
When considering the question of whether to bind
subsequent landowners, one scholar says the answer lies in the
inducement to continue building, improving, and using property:
"[W]e tolerate these 'dead hand' arrangements because they
provide a long lasting security for land development and
encourage property owners to invest in the long term
improvements that are essential to the productive use of real
estate."6 If this rationale has credence, the very idea of
easements stems from a diffuse emphasis on encouraging
development.
2. Promoting Land Use: Servient Estate
Take, for example, disputes between the easement holder
and the owner of the servient estate arising from a right-of-way.
Most courts agree that the owner of the servient estate may not
put up obstacles or structures that encroach on the right-of-
260 See, e.g., Danial v. Town of Delhi, 185 A.D.2d 500, 502, 586 N.Y.S.2d 359,
360-61 (3d Dep't 1992); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 71 (Wash. 1980) (en
banc).
261 See, e.g., Whipple v. Hatcher, 658 S.E.2d 585, 586 (Ga. 2008); Johnston v.
Cornelius, 218 P.3d 129, 135-36 (Or. App. 2009), appeal denied, 228 P.3d 1213 (Or.
2010); Stonier v. Kronenberger, 214 P.3d 41, 46 (Or. App. 2009).
262 See, e.g., Sloan v. Sarah Rhodes, L.L.C., 560 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 2002);
Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443, 452, 705 N.E.2d 649, 653-54, 682 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661-
62 (1998).
263 See Max Gibbons, Of Windfalls and Property Rights: Palazzolo and the
Regulatory Takings Notice Debate, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1259, 1301 (2003); Richard E.
Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV.
373., 373-74 (1935).
264 See Gibbons, supra note 263, at 1298-99; Manning, supra note 263, at 389.
265 Carol M. Rose, Comment, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments
on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1982).
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way.2 66 Some encroachments, however, are relatively minor and
some easement holders rarely, if ever, use their easement. What
policy guides courts on when to deviate from the general premise
restricting the servient estate holder from encroachment?
The Supreme Court of Delaware, in Vandeleigh Industries,
L.L.C. v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, L.L.C. ,267 allowed a
substantial encroachment because the court did not see "the
wisdom of requiring land to be put to no use at all." 6 ' There,
Vandeleigh had an express right-of-way easement over land used
by Stor-All for commercial storage.269 Stor-All, fully aware of the
encumbrance, built an eight-building facility and a retaining wall
that extended to the center of Vandeleigh's easement.2 0 Before
construction began, Vandeleigh objected to any interference with
its easement, but Stor-All ignored the objection and began
construction nonetheless.2 71
At trial, the court ruled that a valid easement existed and
that the easement was not limited to pedestrian traffic but
extended to automobile use.27 2 But then the court found that
"Vandeleigh really has no current use for this parcel."273 Because
the easement holder (Vandeleigh) was not currently using the
property-and therefore infrequently using the easement-the
court could not justify removing or tearing down the retaining
wall.274
I'm just not certain I appreciate the wisdom of requiring land to
be put to no use at all just so someone has a theoretical
right .... Because otherwise what would happen is that land
would sit there fallow in perpetuity, I would assume, without
any use being made of it by anybody ... .275
266 See Howard v. Cramlet, 939 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); Hoff v.
Scott, 453 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Lamb v. Wyo. Game & Fish
Comm'n, 985 P.2d 433, 437-38 (Wyo. 1999); see also Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic
Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 588-89 (Cal. 1984) (noting that where a servient estate
owner encroaches upon the dominant estate owner's easement, the dominant estate
owner may be entitled to legal relief).
267 901 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006).
268 Id. at 100-01.
269 See id. at 92.
270 See id. at 93.
21 See id.
272 See id. at 94-95.
273 Id. at 95.
. See id.
275 Id.
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The court ruled that Vandeleigh, in order to realize the
property rights conferred by the express easement, must
demonstrate an imminent and viable use for the easement.276
Specifically, Vandeleigh must obtain "all necessary regulatory
approvals for the use of the area of the le]asement for a proper
purpose of the [elasement."277
The court not only suspended a real property interest based
on pro-development policy, it required more development to undo
the suspension.27 8 In other words, Vandeleigh lost use of its
easement because it did not use the easement enough.27 9 To
regain use of the easement, it must affirmatively demonstrate
plans to develop and improve its land.2 80
On appeal, Delaware's Supreme Court agreed, reiterating
that Vandeleigh" 'is not presently utilizing the area and has only
speculative, uncertain, and vague plans to do so.' "281 Because
the servient estate constructed an eight-building facility, and
because the easement holder chose not to develop its property,
the policy and the ruling favored the developer.2 8 2 An easement
holder's right to use an express easement was effectively taken
away because of disuse.283
In arriving at this result, the Vandeleigh court looked to the
Restatement (Third) of Property for guidance.28 4 Conflicts among
parties to a servitude, according to the Restatement, require a
balancing test that maximizes "the aggregate utility of the
servitude and the servient estate."8 The Restatement
commentary then defines "socially productive use of land" by
listing several examples.286 Not surprisingly, "development for
residential, commercial, recreational, and industrial uses," is
27. Id. at 95-96.
277 Id. at 96.
27. See id. at 95-96.
279 See id.
280 Id. at 96.
281 Id. at 99 (quoting Renaissance Dev. Corp. v. Universal Props. Group, Inc.,
821 A.2d 233, 237 (R.I. 2003)).
282 See id. at 101-02.
283 See id.
284 See id. at 100.
2" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 cmt. b
(2000)).
286 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 cmt. b
(2000)).
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included in the list.2 87  But the striking part of the definition
sounds in conservation: "Socially productive uses of land include
maintaining stable neighborhoods, conserving agricultural lands
and open space .... "288
Part III, below, discusses how modern courts should
integrate environmental conservation into easement disputes.
The Restatement's rather timid attempt lumps conservation onto
the long standing pro-development policy. While refreshing to
see some recognition of a conservation counterbalance, defining
conservation as a pro-development "use" confuses more than
refines. As if to illustrate this point, the court in Vandeleigh
quotes much of the policy definition but omits all conservation
language.289
3. Promoting Land Use: Relocating Easements
Development policy can also be seen in disputes about an
easement's location. When expressly created, easement location
will often be specified in writing.2 90 Once location has been
established, most jurisdictions reject attempts by either the
easement holder or the servient estate owner to unilaterally
relocate the servitude.29 1 Treating the location as variable would
incite litigation and "discourage the improvement of the land
upon which the easement is charged."2 92 Fascinatingly, the same
pro-development policy supporting the rule also supports the
exception.
287 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 cmt. b
(2000)).
288 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 cmt. b (2000).
289 Vandeleigh, 901 A.2d at 100-01.
290 See, e.g., Teitel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1276-77 (M.D.
Ala. 2003); Edgell v. Divver, 402 A.2d 395, 397-98 (Del. Ch. 1979); Holmstrom v.
Lee, 26 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. App. 2000). The locations of prescriptive easements
are generally determined by the actual use during the prescriptive period. See, e.g.,
Applegate v. Ota, 194 Cal. Rptr. 331, 336-37 (Ct. App. 1983); Swaggerty v.
McKinzey, 876 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Smith v. Bixby, 242 N.W.2d
115, 118-19 (Neb. 1976); Keidel v. Rask, 290 N.W.2d 255, 259 (N.D. 1980).
291 See, e.g., Rogers v. P-M Hunter's Ridge, L.L.C., 967 A.2d 807, 820-26 (Md.
2009); Estate Court, L.L.C. v. Schnall, 49 A.D.3d 1076, 1077-78, 856 N.Y.S.2d 251,
253-54 (3d Dep't 2008); Sweezey v. Neel, 904 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Vt. 2006); Crisp v.
VanLaecken, 122 P.3d 926, 927-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 190
P.3d 140, 147 (Wyo. 2008).
292 Stamatis v. Johnson, 224 P.2d 201, 203 (Ariz. 1950), modified on reh'g, 231
P.2d 956 (Ariz. 1951).
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In M.P.M. Builders, L.L.C. v. Dwyer,293 for example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court allowed the servient estate owner
to unilaterally relocate an express easement based on utilitarian
and development policies.29 4 There, a 1941 deed defined the
location of an expressly created right-of-way.2 95 Sixty years later,
a successor in interest to the servient estate demanded easement
relocation to facilitate its plans to subdivide and develop its
property.2 96 The easement holder objected. On appeal, the court
began its analysis by recognizing the general rule against
unilateral relocation.297
But the Court then turned to the Restatement for the
premise that an easement ought not unduly diminish the
servient owner's use or development of her estate.9 To the
contrary, whether to allow unilateral relocation turns on
"reducing the risk that the easement will prevent future
beneficial development of the servient estate."29 9 As long as the
easement holder retains the advantage of using the easement
without material inconvenience, unilateral relocation is justified
based on the prospect of future development.
4. Promoting Land Use: Dominant Estate
It may not be unfair to say that almost every interest in an
express easement is vulnerable to development. Pro-
development policy does not just favor servient estate owners and
threaten easement holders. Servient estate holders are at risk,
too.3 00 Easements that specify only "horse and buggy"so' or "team
29' 809 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 2004).
294 See id. at 1057.
29. See id. at 1055.
291 See id.
29? See id. at 1056.
299 See id. at 1056-57 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 4.8(3) (2000)).
299 Id.
30o Scores of cases illustrate that even express easements are elastic. In the
following cases, courts found express easements to include more rights than
provided for in writing. See Fla. Power Corp. v. Silver Lake Homeowners Ass'n, 727
So. 2d 1149, 1150-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that utility could replace
wooden frame structures with modern steel structures and increase voltage carried
by wires); State Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. Stricklett, 555 S.E.2d 800,
804 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (finding easement to operate and maintain a dam
encompasses the right "to insure" the safety of the dam); Mattson v. Mont. Power
Co., 215 P.3d 675, 685-88 (Mont. 2009) (finding an express easement to flood and
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and wagon,"3 02 for example, expand with modernity to include all
manner of cars and trucks. An express easement granted in 1820
for horse carts has been interpreted to include gravel trucks
carrying twenty loads a day, expanding the width of the lane and
generating dust in the plaintiffs' homes.o3
Express easements providing a right-of-way have been
interpreted to include the right to erect television cables and
wires,3 04 as well as underground water, gas, or sewer pipes.o5 An
express easement to flood and drain land has been interpreted to
allow erosion.0 Cutting the servient owner's trees to improve
access to an easement has been upheld3 07 as well as "safety" and
drain servient land encompasses the right to cause erosion); Crane Hollow, Inc. v.
Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, L.L.C., 740 N.E.2d 328, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that easement holder could remove trees from pipeline easement to
facilitate aerial observation of pipeline); Bowers v. Tex. E. Transmission Corp., 611
A.2d 1350, 1351-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (permitting easement holder to clear
additional space and replace twenty-inch pipeline with thirty-six-inch pipeline);
Lamar Cnty. Elec. Coop. Ass'n v. Bryant, 770 S.W.2d 921, 923 (Tex. App. 1989)
(recognizing that easement holder could remove branches that interfered with power
line easement).
301 See Skow v. Goforth, 618 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Iowa 2000).
302 McDonnell v. Sheets, 15 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1944) (words "team and
wagon" did not restrict type of vehicle that could use easement).
*0 See Hodgkins v. Bianchini, 80 N.E.2d 464, 466-67 (Mass. 1948).
3 See Parc Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 113-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)
(general right-of-way easement by express reservation encompasses installation of
utilities); Harrington v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 656 A.2d 624, 625 (R.I. 1995) (permitting
use of right-of-way for utility purposes).
305 See Cline v. Richardson, 526 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (easement
for ingress and egress included right to install underground utility lines); Bivens v.
Mobley, 724 So. 2d 458, 464-65 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (declaring that express
easement "for ingress and egress to a tract on which a home is to be built means
more than a surface roadway" and encompasses right to lay waterline); Hill Farm,
Inc. v. Hill Cnty., 436 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex. 1969) (city street easement "is not
confined to the surface but extends to a depth that will enable the urban authority to
do that which is done in every street, including the laying of sewer, gas and water
pipes"). Massachusetts even enacted a statute broadening express right-of-way
easements. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 187, § 5 (West 2009) (granting owners with
right of access over private ways right to construct utility lines on or under such
ways). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 458 (1998); Brown Props., Inc. v.
Looper, 732 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Ark. 1987) ("The grant of an easement for ingress and
egress does not expressly or by implication include the right to lay utilities below the
surface of the easement.").
306 See Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 215 P.3d 675, 685-88 (Mont. 2009).
307 See Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 115-16 (N.D. 1985); see
also Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, L.L.C., 740 N.E.2d 328, 336
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
912
EASEMENTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
"management" activities on the servient owner's land-even
though such activities were absent from the express
agreement.ao
Coincidentally, the backstop protecting servient estate
owners from overzealous development by easement holders is the
servient estate owner's right to use and develop her land.' As
the Restatement puts it, allowing unilateral easement relocation
is a "fair trade-off for the vulnerability of the servient estate to
increased use of the easement to accommodate changes in
technology and development of the dominant estate."s1 o In short,
your easement dispute-no matter what ilk-will enjoy policy
support if: (1) you are developing/improving property;3 1 1 and
(2) your use does not unreasonably impinge on your opponent's
right to develop/improve his property.3 1 2
The fascinating aspect of pro-development policy in
easement law is its adaptability. It is not relegated to
prescription, creation of implied easements, or disputes
stemming from a servient estate owner's interference with an
easement. The frightening aspect of pro-development policy is
that no common law policy favoring conservation stands as a
counterbalance.
III. CONSERVATION COUNTERWEIGHT
[Liand use has historically been favored over disuse, and that
therefore he who uses land is preferred in the law to he who does
not .. 313
311 State Soil & Water Conservation Comm'n v. Stricklett, 555 S.E.2d 800, 804
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Schwarz & Schwarz, L.L.C. v. Caldwell Cnty. R.R. Co., 677
S.E.2d 546, 549 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (railroad may use right-of-way easement to
manage safety risks and may close crossing over tracks that interfered with railroad
operations).
309 See, e.g., Swenson v. Marino, 29 N.E.2d 15, 17 (Mass. 1940); Parsons v. N.Y.,
N.H. & H.R. R.R. Co., 103 N.E. 693, 695 (Mass. 1913); Rendell v. Mass. Dep't of
Conservation & Recreation, No. 05MISC308443KCL, 2009 WL 4441212, at *17
(Mass. Land Ct., 2009).
310 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: (SERVITUDES) § 4.8(3) cmt. f (2000).
311 See Fla. Power Corp. v. Silver Lake Homeowners Ass'n, 727 So. 2d 1149, 1150
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Radspinner, 369 N.W.2d at 115-16.
312 See M.P.M. Builders, L.L.C. v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-58 (Mass.
2004).
313 Finley v. Yuba Cnty. Water Dist., 160 Cal. Rptr. 423, 427 (Ct. App. 1979).
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A. Restricting Implied Easements
As discussed above, courts grant implied easements where
parties to the land conveyance did not. As a result, the dominant
estate holder receives a windfall while the servient estate is
burdened by an inheritable property interest for which the
servient estate holder receives no compensation.3 14 Many
decisions creating implied easements rely on public policy that
promotes land use and development.3 15 Due to the inherent
unfairness in court-created easements and widespread public
concern for conserving wild lands, implied easements should be
curtailed rather than expanded.
One way to limit easements by necessity and easements by
implied grant is to discard the public policy favoring land
development. As noted above, the policy is arguably irrelevant.
Many scholars and courts alike recognize that the age of
America's wilderness faded long ago and that conservationist
policies should replace tireless development.
Eliminating "productive use of land" as a justification for
creating implied easements will force courts to rely on the
contracting parties' intent.3 1 6 Reliance on intent preserves these
easements but also restricts them. A court can still award an
easement by necessity, for example, when evidence shows the
parties paid full value for and anticipated the conveyance of a
" See Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584, 590 (Cal. 1984).
31 See Galvin v. Gaffney, 24 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that
the implication of an easement by necessity could not be defeated by a showing of
contrary actual intent where the parcel was effectively landlocked); B & J Dev. &
Inv., Inc. v. Parsons, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
expectations of one party will not defeat the implication of an easement on public
policy grounds); Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Idaho Ct. App.
1984) ("[Ain easement arises independently from any contract and may even thwart
the intent of the sellers or purchasers."); Ghen v. Piasecki, 410 A.2d 708, 712 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) ("[W]e are satisfied that this mutual intent is not an
essential element in the establishment of a way of necessity. Such an easement is
created as a result of a strong public policy that no land may be made inaccessible or
useless."); Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 192 (Vt. 2006).
31 See, e.g., Hollywyle Ass'n v. Hollister, 324 A.2d 247, 253 (Conn. 1973);
Matthews v. Quarles, 504 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); MacCaskill v.
Ebbert, 739 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Gacki v. Bartels, 859 N.E.2d
1178, 1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Rau v. Collins, 891 A.2d 1175, 1180-84 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2006); Adams v. Planning Bd. of Westwood, 833 N.E.2d 637, 642-43 (Mass App.
Ct. 2005).
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fully accessible tract.3 17 On the other hand, if nothing indicates
the parties' anticipated need for ingress and egress and the price
is below market,1 ' no ambiguity permits the court to re-write the
agreement. The intent approach also removes the servient estate
holder's call for compensation because the purchase price
presumably accounts for the encumbrance.319
Restricting implied easements to a determination of the
parties' intent may result in a greater number of landlocked
tracts. But parties often intend to isolate land:32 0 wilderness and
open areas increase in value as supply decreases, and public
opinion values wild lands more and more. 32 1 Landowners may
hope to protect a species or an ecosystem by denying vehicular
access. Even when unintended, landlocked property honors
freedom of contract and eliminates windfall by requiring
landlocked owners to negotiate and pay for access across
neighboring lands.32 2
31 See Hollywyle Ass'n, 324 A.2d at 252; Matthews, 504 So. 2d at 1247;
MacCaskill, 739 P.2d at 418; Gacki, 859 N.E.2d at 1184.
31 Cf Gulotta v. Triano, 608 P.2d 81, 83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Doten v. Bartlett,
78 A. 456, 458 (Me. 1910).
319 See Matthews, 504 So. 2d at 1247; MacCaskill, 739 P.2d at 418; Gacki, 859
N.E.2d at 1184.
320 See, e.g., Galvin, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 233; Sayre v. Dickerson, 179 So. 2d 57, 68-
70 (Ala. 1965); Gulotta, 608 P.2d at 82; Hewitt v. Meaney, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351-
53 (Ct. App. 1986); Daywalt v. Walker, 31 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902-03 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); Pencader Assocs., Inc. v. Glasgow Trust, 446 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 1982); B.
& J. Dev. & Inv., 887 P.2d at 52; Bob Daniels & Sons, 681 P.2d at 1018-19; Luthy v.
Keehner, 412 N.E.2d 1091, 1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d
1039, 1043 (Me. 1987); Shpak v. Oletsky, 373 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Md. Ct. App. 1977);
Orpin v. Morrison, 120 N.E. 183, 185 (Mass. 1918); White v. Landerdahl, 625 P.2d
1145, 1147 (Mont. 1981); Jackson v. Nash, 866 P.2d 262, 269-70 (Nev. 1993);
Bradley v. Patterson, 435 A.2d 129, 132 (N.H. 1981); Mountain View, Inc. v. Bryson,
336 S.E.2d 432, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Mougey Farms v. Kaspari, 579 N.W.2d
583, 587 (N.D. 1998); Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 974, 978 (Vt. 1983).
321 See Spencer Phillips, Windfalls for Wilderness: Land Protection and Land
Value in the Green Mountains, in 2 WILDERNESS SCIENCE IN A CHANGE OF TIME
CONFERENCE 258, 262 (Stephen F. McCool et al. eds., 2000); Elena G. Irwin, The
Effects of Open Space on Residential Property Values, 78 LAND ECON. 465, 465, 478-
79 (2002); The Economic Benefits of Wilderness: Focus on Property Value
Enhancement, THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY SCIENCE AND POLICY BRIEF, Mar. 2004, at
1, 1-8.
122 See Doten, 78 A. at 458.
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To be sure, many jurisdictions already look to the
contracting parties' intent when deciding whether to grant an
implied easement. 3 2 3 But many assume sufficient intent based
solely on the fact that the property is difficult to access.32 4 When
evidence of parties' intent is inadequate, some jurisdictions
revert to the policy promoting the fullest land use:325
Therefore, the implied intention of the parties is a more
reliable foundation than public policy upon which to build the
analytical framework necessary to sustain easements by
necessity; it is only when the record provides absolutely no
insight from which an inference as to the intent of the parties
can be drawn that public policy is employed as a significant
factor. 326
Courts should limit their analysis to party intent. Resorting
to defunct public policy disserves conservation concerns and
effectively grants easements whenever property becomes
landlocked or difficult to access.
Implied easements by prior existing grant already rely
heavily on the contracting parties' intent.3 27  But some courts
have diluted the intent requirement when the other elements for
easements by implied grant are met.32 8 These courts maintain
323 See, e.g., Hollywyle Ass'n v. Hollister, 324 A.2d 247, 253 n.4 (Conn. 1973);
Matthews, 504 So. 2d at 1247; MacCaskill, 739 P.2d at 417-418; Gacki, 859 N.E.2d
at 1184; Rau v. Collins, 891 A.2d 1175, 1180-84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Adams v.
Planning Bd. of Westwood, 833 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Mass App. Ct. 2005).
324 See supra note 315.
.2. See, e.g., United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1353, (10th Cir. 1997);
Murphy v. Burch, 205 P.3d 289, 293 (Cal. 2009); Kellogg v. Garcia, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d
817, 828 (Ct. App. 2002); Hewitt v. Meaney, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Ct. App. 1986);
Thompson v. Whinnery, 895 P.2d 537, 540 (Colo. 1995); Hurlocker v. Medina, 878
P.2d 348, 352 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
326 Hurlocker, 878 P.2d at 352.
327 See Muzzi v. Bel Air Mart, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 639 (Ct. App. 2009)
("Easements cannot be implied if the express provisions of the lease exclude them.");
Hallock v. Wear, 551 N.E.2d 712, 718-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (grantors "expressly
disavowed any intent to create an easement in plaintiffs' favor"); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.12 cmt. h (2000) ("Implication of a servitude [by
prior usel ... is based on what the parties probably intended or had reasonable
grounds to expect.").
328 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.12 cmt. e (2000) ("The
fact that the use is reasonably necessary lends substantial weight to the conclusion
that the parties had reasonable grounds to expect that the right to continue the use
was included in the conveyance."); id. at cmt. f ("[K]nowledge of [the prior use's]
existence is a useful indicator of their probable intent that the conveyance include a
servitude to continue the use.").
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that only explicit and unambiguous language in the deed will
negate an easement by implied grant when the other factors
exist.3 29  Like easements by necessity, a closer nexus to the
parties' intent ensures that easements by implied grant issue
only when the contracting parties indicate as much, rather than
whenever a pro-development argument is invoked.
Another way to limit implied easements-perhaps in
conjunction with focusing on intent-is to make them harder to
obtain. Courts should turn the policy favoring "productive use"
on its head by imposing a presumption against creating implied
easements. The West Virginia Supreme Court recently "made it
clear that '[t]he law does not favor the creation of easements by
implied grant or reservation.' "330 Supplementing a presumption
against implied easements with a higher burden of proof-clear
and convincing evidence-further restricts pro-development
bias.331
Similarly, the trend favoring "reasonable" necessity over
strict necessity should be reversed. Access that is considered too
steep, too narrow, or too marshy ought not amount to necessity
sufficient to create an easement by operation of law.332 Only the
most egregious cases, where, for example, the tract is wholly
inaccessible and the buyer paid a price similar to that of a fully
accessible tract, will give rise to an inference that the parties
intended to include a way of access.333 Requiring strict necessity
more closely tracks the parties' intent.3 4  Disallowing implied
329 See Dubin v. Robert Newhall Chesebrough Trust, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 872, 878
(Ct. App. 2002); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla. 1975).
330 Cobb v. Daugherty, 693 S.E.2d 800, 807 (W. Va. 2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting Stuart v. Lake Wash. Realty, 92 S.E.2d 891, 898 (1956)).
3a1 See Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler, 229 S.E.2d 732, 735 (W. Va. 1976).
332 See Shaver v. Edgell, 37 S.E. 664, 667 (W. Va. 1900) ("That the way through
his own land is too steep or too narrow does not alter the case. It is only where there
is no way through his own land that the right of way through the land of another can
exist. That a person claiming a way of necessity has already one way is a good
plea . . .. ").
1 See Simonton, supra note 153, at 580.
33 See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 92, § 4:10 ("The strict necessity standard is
based on the belief that necessity is required as a measure of the parties' intent to
create an easement and that such intent should be inferred in only the most
compelling circumstances, such as when the alleged dominant tenement is otherwise
inaccessible.").
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easements when landowners already have access to part of the
land but cannot easily access the rest of it curbs the incessant
call for the "productive use of land."
Finally, courts should limit the scope of implied easements to
encourage sustainable use. In dissecting the nature of a court's
power to create implied easements, one characterized the court's
power as equitable in nature. 35 Because the court acted in
equity, it considered several factors apart from the traditional
easement by necessity test:
[Olur decisions in regard to easements of necessity should not
be read to imply that an easement of necessity always arises as
a matter of law whenever the two required elements are proved
because the equities that drive the creation and the scope of an
easement may vary, requiring the circuit court to weigh the
burdens and benefits the easement would create. 336
That court suggested a number of factors, including whether
the landlocked party was the grantor, whether the landlocked
party knew the land lacked access at purchase, and the value of
the property with and without the easement. 337  Given the
overwhelming public concern for environmental conservation,
why not allow courts to go a step further and consider ecological
and environmental effects of the claimed easement? Moreover,
instead of granting an outright easement in perpetuity that may
someday expand with the dominant estate, why not limit the
easement's use?
Implied easements over government lands provide an apt
analogy. When private landowners claim implied easements that
burden national parks, national forests, and other government
lands, courts often impose restrictions on the easement's scope.33 8
To preserve "one of the few prairie savanna habitats west of the
.. McCormick v. Schubring, 672 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wisc. 2003).
.. Id. at 67-68.
.. See id. at 68-70.
338 See McFarland v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 1106, 1110-12 (9th Cir. 2008); Hale
v. Norton, 437 F.3d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining the existence of a right-of-
way over national park land does not shield an inholder from reasonable regulation
by the Park Service); Adams v. United States, 3 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 1993)
(observing preservation of land is an important consideration where the United
States owns the servient estate for the benefit of the public); see also Fitzgerald
Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
government has authority to impose some regulations on the use of roads regardless
of any common law easements held by private individuals).
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Continental Divide," one court stated an easement by necessity
"could be limited in scope to ... non-motorized means."3"
Easement use can be limited to a particular season,3 40 particular
vehicles,3 4 ' and include various other conditions.34 2 Some are
subject to termination at the will of the servient estate holder-
the forest service or national park service.34 3 Limiting the life of
such easements may transform them into licenses, 44 but other
use restrictions allow the holder to retain an inheritable interest
in real property-one that is not subject to unchecked expansion
but that conforms with broader societal goals.
B. Abolishing Prescriptive Easements
Good arguments support abolition of prescriptive easements.
The doctrine's genesis confuses more than clarifies its
application. Fictional "grants" that are fictionally lost undermine
modern recording statutes and serve no contemporary purpose.
The doctrine survives only by grafting public policy from adverse
possession law. That policy, which perpetually promotes the
fullest use and improvement of land, holds increasingly little
relevance. As a result, easements justified principally on this
policy should be abolished or materially restricted.
31 McFarland v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Mont. 2006).
340 See Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005); McFarland,
464 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (finding that Park Service can limit easement access in the
winter for reasons of safety, environmental resource protection).
341 See McFarland, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (finding that Park Service could
restrict claimant's implied easement to "non-motorized means and egress by
snowmobile in emergency situations during the winter").
342 See United States v. Jenks, 804 F. Supp. 232, 236-37 (D.N.M. 1992) ("[Elven
if [the court agrees] with defendant that there are preexisting easements for each of
the roads . . . [the United States] can still regulate these access rights pursuant to
[the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act] and [the Federal Land Policy
Management Act]."), rev'd, 22 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994).
343 See Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1267 (9th Cir.
2006) ("We conclude further that the conditions in the easement providing for the
suspension, revocation, or termination of the easement also are reasonable.").
344 See Blackburn v. Lefebvre, 976 So. 2d 482, 490 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); Brown
v. Rice, 716 So. 2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Millbrook Hunt, Inc. v. Smith,
249 A.D.2d 281, 282, 670 N.Y.S.2d 907, 908-09 (2d Dep't 1998); Morning Call, Inc. v.
Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc., 761 A.2d 139, 144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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The secondary rationale supporting prescriptive
easements-that they clear title and fulfill long-held
expectations-possibly justifies an extremely limited existence.34 6
Where the claimant uses property for a long period in accord with
a documented grant to do so, prescription makes sense when the
documentation is erroneous.346 In such cases, prescription
justifies good faith expectations and clears obscured title without
undermining recording statutes or encouraging land exploitation.
Absent abolition or restricting prescriptive claims to those
made under color of title, courts should at least require claimants
prove each element. Many jurisdictions presume the claimant's
trespass meets the adverse requirement unless shown
otherwise. 34 7  "Where a use has been open, continuous, visible
and uninterrupted for a period of longer than ten years, a
presumption arises that the use was adverse and under a claim
of right and the burden shifts to the landowner to show that the
use was in fact permissive. "348 This "shortcut"3 49 cuts the wrong
345 See Clinger v. Hartshorn, 89 P.3d 462, 466 (Colo. App. 2003) (affirming a jury
determination of a prescriptive easement after eighteen years of use without
permission pursuant to an ineffective grant); Klar Crest Realty, Inc. v. Rajon Realty
Corp., 459 A.2d 1021, 1025 (Conn. 1983) (upholding a jury's determination of a
prescriptive easement after over sixteen years of use pursuant to an invalid grant).
346 See Inch v. McPherson, 859 P.2d 755, 758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Gilardi v.
Hallam, 636 P.2d 588, 590 (Cal. 1981); Clinger, 89 P.3d at 466 (declaring that
easement by prescription may be acquired by use "pursuant to an attempted but
ineffective grant"); Klar Crest Realty, 459 A.2d at 1025; Walker v. Hollinger, 968
P.2d 661, 666-67 (Idaho 1998); Montagne v. Elliott, 92 P.3d 731, 739 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) ("The use of an easement under a mistaken belief as to the recorded location of
a way is sufficient to satisfy the element of hostility."); Garrett v. Mueller, 927 P.2d
612, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that use of roadway under mistaken belief that
claimant had recorded easement was sufficient to establish prescriptive right);
Kondor v. Prose, 622 P.2d 741, 744 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); see also Plymouth Canton
Cmty. Crier, Inc. v. Prose, 619 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
claimant obtained prescriptive easement for loading and unloading based on
mistaken belief as to scope of express easement).
3 See Hodgins v. Sales, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (Idaho 2003); Moss v. Ward, 881
S.W.2d 238, 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Homan v. Hutchison, 817 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Speer v. Carr, 429 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Mo. 1968); Hamad
Assam Corp. v. Novotny, 737 N.W.2d 922, 925 (S.D. 2007); Rancour v. Golden
Reward Mining Co., 694 N.W.2d 51, 54 (S.D. 2005).
38 Moss, 881 S.W.2d at 242 (citing Neale v. Kottwitz, 769 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989); Hornan, 817 S.W.2d at 948; Gill Grain Co. v. Poos, 707 S.W.2d 434,
437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Burgess v. Sweet, 662 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)).
349 Hodgins, 76 P.3d at 976 ("Although clear and convincing proof of each of the
elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement is generally essential to a
claim, there is a shortcut in terms of proving adverse use." (emphasis added)).
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way; the presumption should be reversed. Before rewarding
trespass with inheritable rights in real estate, claimants ought to
bear the full burden of proving the claim.
The one bright spot in prescription jurisprudence stems from
the "wild lands" exception.35 o When an alleged easement involves
wild or unenclosed lands, some courts impose "a rebuttable
presumption that use of such lands is permissive, and the burden
is on the party asserting the easement to establish adversity.""'
While it is refreshing to see property law favor wild lands, this
presumption should be universal. A prescriptive claimaint
should carry the burden to prove each element by clear and
convincing evidence at all times.
Finally, some private undeveloped lands are protected by
statute from prescriptive easements. For example, owners of
woodlands cannot easily detect open and notorious prescriptive
use against unknown encroachments; a Pennsylvania statute
bars prescriptive easements through unenclosed woodlands. 352 If
the common law fails to curb public policy favoring land
development, a patchwork of statutes may ultimately supersede
large areas of property law.
C. Balancing Express Easements
Public policy favoring land development saturates disputes
arising from scope and management of expressly created
easements.3 53 Whether it is the easement holder seeking to
expand easement use in order to facilitate development of the
dominant estate or the servient estate owner seeking to restrict
easement use in order to develop the servient estate, pervasive
policy supports developing and "improving" land.3 54
350 See, e.g., id.
3" Id.; see Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 570 P.2d 870, 873-74 (Idaho 1977); Moss, 881
S.W.2d at 242; Hamad Assam Corp., 737 N.W.2d at 927 n.2; Rancour, 694 N.W.2d at
54 (recognizing that where land is wild, unimproved, and unenclosed, the
uninterrupted use of the land for the statutorily prescribed period does not raise a
presumption that the use is adverse).
352 See 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 411 (1981). For cases analyzing this statute, see
Sprankle v. Bums, 675 A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (Pa. 1996) (discussing the statute);
Martin v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 666 A.2d 637, 640-41 (Pa. 1995) (same).
3 See, e.g., Johnson v. Suttles, 227 P.3d 664, 669 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009).
* See id.
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That policy must be revisited. Entirely one-dimensional, it
fails to countenance overdevelopment and rising national concern
for conservation of open and undeveloped lands. Despite
national consensus favoring conservation, modern courts remain
wedded to nineteenth-century development policy. Such courts
recoil at the prospect of "idle lands,"55 disfavor "absentee
landowners,"3 56 and question "the wisdom of requiring land to be
put to no use."5
One solution suggests subverting the policy altogether.
Without the pervasive policy promoting land development, what
remains? "Protecting" private property rights might inform
decisions in close cases. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for
example, denied a developer's request to relocate an easement to
accommodate new construction.5 In doing so, the court elevated
"safeguard[ing] property rights" over "economically unproductive
behavior."35 ' The Court expressly rejected two sections from the
Restatement, noting that the Court was not convinced that "the
interest in increased development of property should overcome
the durability of easement rights."3 60
But reliance on private property rights can be just as one-
dimensional as reliance on land development policy. Dedication
to private property ownership reverses course and turns the ship
back toward Blackstone's view on an absolute right to exclude
others.' Private property is no longer sacrosanct such that the
community may not interfere with its domain. 36 2
... See Traders, Inc. v. Bartholomew, 459 A.2d 974, 978 (Vt. 1983).
356 See Johnson, 227 P.3d at 666, 668-70.
.. Vandeleigh Indus. v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, L.L.C, 901 A.2d 91, 95
(Del. 2006).
358 See AKG Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835, 838, 840 (Wis.
2006).
3* Id. at 845.
360 Id. at 846.
365 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12
(1927).
362 See id. (stating that in past regimes where land was the main source of
livelihood, the landowner received "homage and service from those who wishled] to
live on [the land]").
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CONCLUSION
America has changed; our property law has not. In the
1800s, when 95% of America was wilderness, and when the
government's claim to these lands was itself tenuous, it made
sense to encourage settlement and development of wild land.
That policy became deeply ingrained. It informs almost every
common law property doctrine, including easements.
A review of easement disputes through case law shows that
courts continue to cite and rely on nineteenth-century pro-
development policy. Courts cite this policy to justify (1) the
creation of implied easements, (2) the recognition of prescriptive
easements, and (3) the enforcement decisions arising from
express easements. Given the evolution of popular opinion and
receding wild lands, a counterbalance is needed.
The creation of implied and prescriptive easements should be
restricted rather than facilitated. If a court creates an easement
by implication, it should restrict the easement's scope in time or
type, similar to easements awarded over federal government
lands. Instead of "reasonable" necessity, courts should require
strict necessity before awarding implied easements arising from
accessibility claims. Prescriptive easements could be abolished
altogether or severely limited to good faith claims made under
color of title.
Perhaps most importantly, property law needs a policy
overhaul. Courts considering easement disputes should not
presume that use trumps nonuse or that developed land out-
strips idle land. Some consideration that reflects the importance
of unused wild land is needed to balance an otherwise unchecked
drive to develop.
" See Sprankling, supra note 76, at 519 (discussing the trend in American
property law favoring wilderness destruction over wilderness preservation).
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APPENDIX364
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